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For over fifty years scientists have attempted to prove a causal relation between inequality 
and conflict and how this relation influence societies, but with no clear result. Theoretic 
assumptions on the relation between inequality and conflict appear more unified than the 
empirical results from testing it, and overall, there is a mismatch between theoretic 
postulations and empirical scrutiny on the relation between inequality and conflict. The aim of 
this thesis is to enter this sphere of scholarly discourse and to analyze whether some elements 
may be highlighted that may contribute to close the gap between theory and empirical 
evidence on the issue. This will be done from the perspective of political theory, where a 
combination of theory, empirics and concepts will provide the basis for this approach, by 
presenting some concepts of the so-called Inequality-Conflict (IC)-nexus, scrutinizing some 
aspects of theory on the IC-nexus, including some empirical results from IC-nexus studies and 
theorizing on that basis. The main argument of the thesis is that the concepts utilized when 
studying the IC-nexus may have been too incompatible to provide any unified empirical 
result, and which also have provided unsatisfactorily ground for comparisons between 
empirical studies. To try to battle this problem, I conclude my thesis by providing a two-part 
outline of a general framework for the IC-nexus supported by the theorizing done in this 
thesis, and based on the findings in this study. The two-part outline of the general framework 
consists first of a support for one clear theoretic position which is a positive linear relation 
between inequality and conflict, and the second part consists of a conceptual framework 
which takes it departure from the concepts of inequality and conflict, supported by some of 
the features of these concepts. A conclusive additional remark is that it is here also argued, as 
a result of this study, that on a general level, the use of a broad form of political theory and 
more practical application of political theory, can be a remedy for confronting issues of 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
The history of inequality, writes Thomas Piketty: 
  
 (...) has always been chaotic and political, influenced by convulsive social changes and driven 
 not only by economic factors but countless social, political, military, and cultural phenomena 
 as well. Socioeconomic inequalities (...) are always both causes and effects of other 
 developments in other spheres. All these dimensions of analysis are inextricably 
 intertwined (Piketty 2014, 274-275; emphasis added). 
 
It is particularly the relation to one specific outcome which inequality is considered to be a 
cause of that will be investigated in this thesis, and that is how inequality may cause conflict. 
This is the central theme for this thesis, how inequality might cause conflict and how this 
mechanism is, have, and can be understood. This function between inequality and conflict 
will be known and referred to throughout this thesis as the IC-nexus. As the inequality side of 
the IC-nexus seems to have a wide range of area of influence, for the conflict side of the IC-
nexus, it is reasonable to also include one aspect of this part of the nexus as well, here done by 
highlighting its central role in politics: "The grand strategy of politics deals with public policy 
concerning conflict. This is the policy of policies, the sovereign policy – what to do about 
conflict." (Schattschneider 1957, 935). And if it is possible to identify the source, or at least a 
source of conflict, it is reasonable to infer that that would be a practical knowledge to have 
available when trying to decide what to do about conflict, and thus how to structure, modify 
and prepare societies for contemporary and upcoming challenges. The contribution of this 
thesis for trying to achieve this objective, that is to reveal the mechanisms of the IC-nexus, is 
done by evaluating some aspects of the IC-nexus, mainly in the theoretic domain, but also by 
including some empirical studies, with a continued emphasis on the use concepts. This is all 
done by approaching the study of the IC-nexus from the field of political theory. 
 
For close to fifty years, scholars had tried, without luck, to unravel the relation between 
inequality and conflict, but the results of these studies in total are inconclusive (Østby 2013, 
206). Critics have pointed to several possible causes for this inconclusiveness in the studies of 
the connection between inequality and conflict, pointing to missing control variables, 
inadequate data, issues regarding temporal and spatial choices, and that how inequality have 
been conceptualized may also be a hindrance in providing more conclusive results from these 
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kind of studies (Østby 2013, 211). The issue of conceptualization, and in addition the use and 
understanding of concepts, is a main area which will be evaluated in this thesis, i.e. in how 
concepts have been used and understood in the studies of the IC-nexus. It is in this thesis 
considered that the challenges regarding conceptualization of the IC-nexus relates to both 
sides of the nexus, i.e. both inequality and conflict. The reason for specifying this focus on 
conceptualization in the initiation of this study is because the way concepts have been used, 
understood  and constructed in trying to resolve the inequality-conflict riddle is here 
considered to be a potential reason for why it hasn't been resolved. 
 
A central aim of my thesis is to seek to bring clarity to the relation between inequality and 
conflict, and this relation will consequently in this study be derived from the main term which 
is, and will primarily be referred to as the IC-nexus. Though at times referred to only as the 
nexus, or the IC-puzzle, or other closely connected terms for this nexus, but when such 
alterations are made, it should be apparent from the context from which they emerge that the 
reference is to the IC-nexus, i.e. the relation between inequality and conflict in society. To 
repeat and specify, the IC-nexus is thus the relation between inequality and conflict in a 
society, and points to the mechanism of how this relation operates in that society. In addition, 
to include the theoretic support of this mechanism as it is understood in this thesis, is that it is 
understood such that a rise in inequality increases the probability of conflict in the society 
which harbours those inequalities. So the causation in the IC-nexus is here understood to 
mean that an increase or decrease in inequality, is likely to cause increases or decreases in 
conflict. The reason it operates through probability is because there are assumed to be several 
factors which can neutralize, dampen or even amplify this main effect of the IC-nexus. 
Support for this position will be documented and shown through this thesis. 
 
The IC-nexus has been studied under a variety of names, and any reference in this thesis to 
other studies which have tried to elaborated on the IC-nexus, but which have utilized other 
more or less closely connected concepts while studying it, will when referring to them often 
be transformed into the unified container of the IC-nexus by using the concepts of inequality 
and conflict as two general containers for a plethora of related concepts which have been in 
use. Usually in IC-nexus studies where related concepts of inequality and conflict have been 
used, inequality is often reduced to a particularly type of inequality, as it is with the concept 
of conflict as well, but in addition conflict is sometimes also changed to a conflict related 
concept. It should be added on this matter, that inconsistency in the use of concepts is a 
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collective problem in the field of social sciences where concepts are not easily agreed upon 
(Collier and Mahon 1993, 845). Either way it is here attempted to avoid, and even battle the 
problems rising from inconsistent use of concepts, emerging both from collective and 
individual inconsistency, in this instance by providing a clear understanding for the IC-nexus, 
though mainly as a precursor for the sake of the study in this thesis. 
 
The IC-nexus was in 1964 explored by Bruce M. Russett (Russett 1964), which is a study that 
by several scholars have been identified as the origin of the quantitative empirical testing of 
the now more developed IC-question (see e. g. Lichbach 1989, 433-434; Østby 2013, 209; 
Bartusevicius 2014, 37). But after the nearly fifty years of empirical research, these efforts 
had not been able to provide statistical evidence of a robust link between inequality and 
conflict (Østby 2013, 206). And even though IC-nexus studies by recently shifting the focus 
from individual inequality, which had been the usual approach when studying the nexus, to 
group inequality seems to have made some gains in providing evidences for a more thorough 
empirical link of the IC-nexus (Østby 2013, 206), and may also raise hopes that it is possible 
to understand this connection solely by scientific approaches, this is not the avenue which will 
be followed in this thesis. I will follow another path which seems to have been neglected 
when studying the IC-nexus, which is here considered, through its neglect, as another possible 
cause for the inconclusive results assembled in the first fifty years or so of the study of the IC-
nexus. The trail that will be picked up here for trying to contribute to unravel the mechanism 
of the IC-nexus is through utilizing the field of political theory. On this specific occasion, in 
this thesis that is, this approach will also entail the employment of a broader form of political 
theory than usually applied in political studies, an approach which was almost abandoned 
with the attempt to exclude it from political science as occurred in the first part of the 
twentieth century (Alexander 2018, 406), and which is in this thesis seen as a possible reason 
of incomplete findings in political studies, especially regarding scientific tests and evaluations 
of the IC-nexus. 
 
It should be noted that even if the evidence of the existence of the IC-nexus through the effort 
of contemporary scientific approaches has not yet been able to provide conclusive results of if 
the nexus even exists, and if it exists what kind of function it has in a society, the theoretic 
support for its existence runs deep in the field of political theory, and can at least be traced 
back to thoughts about politics originated in ancient Greece (Nagel 1974, 453). I will return to 
8 
 
this point and elaborate on the theoretic lineage of the IC-nexus at a later stage, when the 
evaluation of the theories related to the nexus is carried out. 
 
All this taken together signifies that the main focus for this thesis is to try to contribute to the 
understanding of the IC-nexus by utilizing a theoretic approach set out from the field of 
political theory, with an emphasis on the use and understanding of the concepts involved in 
studies of the IC-nexus. The objective of this theoretic advance is to try to outline out a 
general framework for understanding the IC-nexus based on theorizing on available theory 
and empiric studies, and through clarification of concepts. By this approach the ambition is to 
be able to contribute to the field of political studies by providing a platform which can 
function for both continued empirical testing of the IC-nexus which are compatible even when 
testing different dimensions of the nexus, and also to try to combine central aspects of the IC-
nexus for further theoretical evaluations of its nature. 
 
The thesis is divided into eight chapters. Following this first introductory chapter, the second 
chapter consists of a short presentation of some central concepts utilized in this thesis. In the 
third chapter the focus is laid on the position of political theory in political studies and its 
relation to political science, both historically and contemporary. This is because there have 
been major alterations in the positioning of political theory in political studies, and since this 
thesis is centred in political theory, it is here considered preferable, even necessary, to provide 
a framework of the standings of political theory in political studies as a point to debark from 
when utilizing political theory as the approach for this study. In addition, through reflecting 
on the standings and development of political theory in political studies in the third chapter, 
this chapter will also function as a prologue for the fourth chapter which consist a presentation 
of some of the methods available for contemporary political theorists. The fifth chapter 
consists of an overview of some central theoretical influence for the understanding of the IC-
nexus, which also works as a backdrop for the selection of concrete empirical studies included 
in this thesis and the general understanding of the IC-nexus. The sixth chapter of this thesis 
consists of a view on a selection of empirical work that have been performed when trying to 
unravel the IC-puzzle. The reason for just including a selection scientific empirical studies of 
the IC-nexus is based on a methodical rationale, where the main purpose is not to evaluate the 
results of the empirical tests, but extract information from them to highlight other, mainly 
conceptual, issues in the study of the IC-nexus. When these six first chapters are completed, 
the attention will turn to the discussion and evaluation of the findings revealed until this point, 
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and will consist of a two part outline of a general framework for the IC-nexus. This two part 
outline will consist of a support for a specific theoretic position of the function of the IC-
nexus, and the second part of the outline consists of a conceptual framework of the same 
nexus. This two part general framework constitute chapter seven. Finally there will in the 
eighth and last chapter of this thesis be presented a conclusion of the findings detected in this 
study, and also provided recommendations for further research based on those results, both in 
the empirical and theoretical domain, especially for political studies. 
 
Chapter 2: Inequality, conflict and optimal inequality 
 
The purpose of this second chapter of this thesis is mainly to provide a conceptual toolbox for 
the theorizing done in this thesis. That means just that the most central concepts employed in 
this thesis gets a closer look and explanation, and for this thesis these main concepts are 
inequality and conflict which constitute the central part of the IC-nexus, and in addition the 
concept of optimal inequality, a concept which is generated here for the purpose of explaining 
some features of the IC-nexus while theorizing about it. The reason that optimal inequality is 
included in this part of conceptual clarifications, except for being a new concept, constructed 
for the purpose of this study which in itself requires an explanation of it, though based on 
already established ideas, is that this concept is considered to provide an instrument which 
makes the final outline of the general framework for the IC-nexus, which is the one objective 
of this thesis, easier to assemble. 
 
Social sciences are riddle with concepts of multiple meanings (Collier and Mahon 1993, 845), 
and it is preferable that a researcher at least provide the understanding of the central concepts 
that are utilized in the current study, to prepare for a clearer dialectic advancements of the 
matter at hand, as is done here, or at least to provide a foundation for a clearer analysis of 
empirical results if that is the object of the study. And even if it is political theory which is the 
approach utilized here, not social science per se, as political theory can by some be seen to 
resemblance humanistic research more than scientific research (Grant 2002, 578), these 
concepts of science and theory to a certain degree must overlap since they still both contains 
political studies, and must utilize the same concepts, even though the understanding of 
concepts may diverge. In addition, even if some prefer to have more or less clarified 
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distinctions between science and theory as with the division, or rather the divisions, between 
political science and political theory, the concepts themselves drift between the two 
disciplines more fluently since: "(...) concepts are not only elements of a theoretical system, 
but equally tools for fact-gathering, data containers." (Sartori 1970, 1052). From this it can be 
inferred that whatever choice one takes to contribute to understand a subject, as in this case in 
trying to understand the IC-nexus through theorizing about it and clarifying concepts, the use 
of concepts still relates to associated disciplines and other approaches for research, as in this 
case to those disciplines who are more occupied with empirical testing, and thus the concepts 
should not be used haphazardly as if closely related concepts are equals. 
 
As indicated in the introduction, it is in this thesis considered that conceptual inconsistency is 
an event that has occurred in the study of the IC-nexus by researchers not being unified in the 
use of concepts when researching effects of the IC-nexus. I do not claim that this 
inconsistency of the use of concepts when relating to the nexus is a conscious choice by the 
researchers of this nexus, but rather a consequence of a broader neglect of the contribution 
that theory can provide by reducing the position of political theory in academia, and in a 
belief that science alone can produce insights as an automatic consequence of producing 
scientific results. This seems at least to be the issue of the IC-nexus, where a overabundance 
of production of empirical results has not led to any conclusive conclusion, rather a mixture of 
diverging results, which were already detected for these types of studies around thirty years 
ago (see Lichbach 1989, 436-440). This is not to strange either, since the production of facts 
are not enough to settle disputes (McDermott 2008, 22). I won't proceed any longer at this 
point, but I will return to it, into this debate of the standings of political theory and political 
science more than it is here considered that the neglect of political theory is in this thesis 
understood as one of the causes of why political science in many instances seems 
disorientated in the jungle of available concepts, which appears to stem partly from the 
neglect of political theory, and thus neglecting a source of conceptual clarity.  
 
Another reason for using time at the start of this thesis in clarifying and developing concepts 
is that this venture has also been encouraged, i.e. that a demarcation of classifications should 
be a preparatory undertaking to arrange a ground for better scientific interchanges (Sartori 
1970, 1040). And as mentioned for the specific ambition of this thesis, in trying to contribute 
to establish an active and dynamic theoretical framework for the IC-nexus by presenting an 
outline of a general framework, it is here considered essential to address the primary 
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challenge of the multitude of concepts used in the studies of the IC-nexus, and not get 
entangled in the net of confusions it creates. 
 
Thus, to be able to provide such an outline of a general framework, this outline has to be able 
to be utilized both for further theoretical advances and evaluations regarding the IC-nexus, but 
it also has to be a framework that has the potential to provide a unified basis for empirical 
investigations of the same nexus. This last part also makes some limitations on the level of 
abstractions for the concepts used, since they must be of a certain capacity that makes them 
amendable to reduced abstractions. This means that the most abstract concept used on this 
occasion must be what Giovanni Sartori calls empirical universals, which are universal 
concepts that are amendable to empirical investigations (Sartori 1970, 1035). This is in this 
thesis achieved with the use of inequality and conflict as the most abstract level of the IC-
nexus, and will shortly be explained how it can connect with empirical investigations. The 
concept of optimal inequality on the other hand, does not have the same empirical connection 
as the two other concepts, but this concept is not foremost applied to be positively identified, 
but rather it exist as a concept for helping to explain the mechanisms of the IC-nexus, and 
thus is on this occasion relieved for the requirement of being subjected to positive 
observations. But for the concepts of both inequality and conflict, the demand for being 
empirical universals applies. This will be done by applying the functions of the ladder of 
abstraction provided by Giovanni Sartori, where a central function of this ladder is that it has 
a vertical dimension for reduced and increased level of abstraction, with a relation to a 
reduced and increased level of analysis, though this relation between abstraction and analysis 
is not absolute (Sartori 1970, 1040-1041). This function will be used on the change of 
abstraction applied on the two central concepts of the IC-nexus, i.e. inequality and conflict, 
with reduced level of abstraction in the lower level of these two main dimensions, which at 
the same time increases the level of analysis when descending into these lower level 
dimensions. 
 
There are certainly many concepts that could be examined here, but the decision made for this 
thesis is that it is preferable to focus on the two central concepts of this thesis, i.e. inequality  
and conflict, and in addition to include the concept of optimal inequality introduced in this 
thesis, or at least formulated as optimal inequality in this thesis, though it is possible to 




The reason for this limitation of only focusing on these three concepts, is based on a 
consideration that this will provide the necessary tools to carry out the discussion of the IC-
nexus, by keeping the number of concepts to a minimum as this reduction offers necessary 
clarity through manageability and relevance. The purpose here is to present an understanding 
of these concepts in the context of this thesis to have them available as a reference point while 
discussing the focal issue of this thesis, which is the IC-nexus, and have them available to be 
utilized in a conceptual framework of the IC-nexus, by giving them a bit of conceptual depth. 
A special note for the concept of inequality is that this concept will sometimes be highlighted 
through the discussion of the concept of equality, since these two concepts are closely 
connected, at least in this thesis, as they are here seen as two extremities of a scale. 
 
This scale where equality and inequality are the two extremities, is here named the scale of 
inequality. On this scale one finds absolute equality on the far left side, and absolute 
inequality on the opposite extreme, with gradation of inequalities in-between (see Model 1 for 
a visual presentation of the scale of inequality). The setup of the scale of inequality is also 
relevant to a primary understanding of the concept of optimal inequality, which is also located 
on this scale, positioned between the middle position on the scale and absolute equality. In 
this understanding, it is possible to see equality as just a form of inequality, when inequality 
has reached zero, i.e. when a society does not harbour any more inequality. Though that 
phrasing requires a little specification, since it is in this thesis considered that when equality is 
achieved, society disappears. This is based on the same idea that Thomas Hobbes writes of the 
equality of men. He claims that in the natural condition men are equals to each other, this 
even as there naturally also exist differences between men in their capacities as in strength of 
body or the possession of wit, both can outperform each other which provides a condition of 
equality. This situates a condition of war: "(...) where every man is enemy to every man; (...), 
wherein men live without other security, than their own strength, (...). In such condition there 
is no place for industry; (...) no culture of the earth; (...) no arts; no letters; no society; (...)." 
(Hobbes 1996, 82-84). So by writing that society harbours equality is somewhat illogical 
since it is here considered that there is no society without inequality, but for the sake of the 
explanation of the scale of inequality it is allowed to stand as a supplementary phrasing to 
support the idea of the scale of inequality. The scale of inequality presented in this thesis, can 
also be seen as related to the idea supporting the Gini index. Since the Gini index 0 means 
total equality and 1 means absolute inequality (Pedersen 2019, 13). However, the scale of 
inequality produced and used for this thesis has greater capacity for theoretic utilization, while 
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the Gini-index have more direct empirical utilisation capability, which makes the scale of 
inequality more proper for this project. 
 
Model 1: The scale of inequality 
To start with presenting the concept of inequality, I`ll start at the end of equality, since one of 
the central discussion around the concept of equality has been the equality of what? question, 
based on writings by Amartya Sen, that the question of what that should be distributed when it 
comes to equality, is  influenced by several issues, e.g. which principle of justice should be at 
the base of evaluating equality and what it is that should be distributed to achieve equality  
(Pedersen 2019, 22). Sen emphasizes one of the difficulties with handling equality, and this 
difficulty is based on the different needs of the relevant comparable actors which makes it 
hard to decide what constitute equality. He identifies that an issue of concern when debating 
equality is that humans differ, and human actors in society have different needs and interests 
that makes it hard to evaluate how distribute in a way that enhance equality (Sen 1979, 202). 
As a simple example it is possible to consider two men's nutritious needs if one of them is 
healthy man of 2.00 meters with a weight of 100 kg, and the other is a man on 1.70 meters 
with a weight of 70 kg with several health conditions, it is understandable that to find an equal 
share of rations between the two is not straight forward if one consider the prospect of equally 
fulfilling the need of the receiver, and at the same time giving them the same amount of 
whatever that is supposed to be distributed. This is just a simple analogy, but it is possible to 
extrapolate this example to other concerns relating to a plethora of physical and psychological 
issues, influenced by factors like gender, culture, race, and age which can influence needs that 
may not easily be solved through equal measures, and what this equality should rest on. A 
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small note to mention here is that there exist several other understandings of equality than the 
one which I extracted above from Hobbes, so when discussing equality in general I am not 
extrapolating my understanding of equality to others, though when discussing and 
understanding the IC-nexus in this thesis, the Hobbesian understanding of equality applies. 
 
Even if there are some issues with how to understand equality, there is a divide that will be 
utilized in this paper which is the divide of equality of opportunities and resources. The 
reasons for dividing equality into these two dimensions are several, but it is here mainly a 
practical choice since these two categories of equality considered here include at great length 
possibilities for evaluating different forms of equality, while not being too narrow an 
approach by just rely on resources alone which is a tempting thing to do, since in a empiric 
perspective monetary demarcation of resources is cost effective, though may not be able to 
provide complete understanding of the issue which is tried highlighted. The reason for 
choosing resources and opportunities as sub-dimensions of equality is based on David Millers 
position that human beings have certain needs that has to be fulfilled to live a decent life, 
which includes opportunity and resources. Though he also include freedom, beside resources 
and opportunities (Miller 2007, 5), but the concept of freedom is for this paper excluded since 
it is judge here to not contribute to the understanding of the IC-nexus. Freedom is in this 
thesis, as with several other concepts, considered to be found inside, and in the intersection of 
the dimensions of opportunity and resources. In addition, freedom would most likely become 
a nuisance when evaluating how to understand that concept in itself, and also in an eventuality 
where one would have to evaluate on how to proceed from theory to empirical testing. So to 
lay the foundation for a conceptual framework of the IC-nexus which also includes the 
opportunity for easier applications to empirical testing, freedom is excluded at this point. 
 
By looking at the scale of inequality (shown above in Model 1), and as explained, equality is 
just one extreme of that scale, and by moving away from the level of equality, which only 
have one condition, which is absolute equality, the dimensions of resources and opportunities 
follows along. In that way, this understanding of the central components of equality is 
transferred over to inequality, and thus concept of inequality is in this thesis also considered 
to consist of the two dimensions, which are resources and opportunities (see Model 2a below 
on page 21). This distinction is here also just placed on an abstract level for the sake of 
discussion, though a bit less abstract than solely relying on inequality as a standalone concept. 
It is also possible to continue this reduction of abstraction into subsections of inequality of 
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resources into political, social and economical resources, as mentioned, though in another 
setting, by Frances Stewart (Stewart 2002, 3), and this further categorization with reduced 
abstraction and heightened concretization can apply for opportunity as well, with the same 
categories (see Model 2b below on page 21). But it is here considered that the primary 
division into resources and opportunities is satisfactory and even preferable when dealing 
with the IC-nexus on from a theoretic perspective. 
 
The reduction or increase of abstraction will also be applied when presenting these models 
with the utilization of the three levels of abstraction provided by Sartori, which consist of a 
high level (HL), a medium level (ML) and a low level (LL), where the level of abstraction 
increases on the way up, and decreases on the way down (Sartori 1970, 1041). Any further 
concretization from the medium level, which is where resources and opportunities are located, 
as is their immediate subordinate categories of economy, social and political, is in this paper 
viewed as dilemma foremost for empirical scientist, and not necessarily a problem that has to 
be solved here, since the discussion in this thesis relates mostly to the theoretic level. It could 
even become a hindrance in certain situations to include particular possible but unnecessary 
instances of reduced abstraction or operationalization, by obscuring the wider picture of the 
theoretic proposals, which is one area of where the problem arises within the IC-nexus. 
 
The other concept of the IC-nexus, i.e. the concept of conflict, will get a shorter presentation 
than inequality, but as with the concept of inequality, the concept of conflict is also presented 
foremost for the purpose of presenting the concept of how it is understood in this thesis. The 
concept of conflict will also be divided into two subsections, just as with inequality with its 
two dimensions of resources and opportunities, where the two sub-dimensions for conflict are 
divided into a violent and a non-violent distinction. The understanding of conflict is for this 
paper founded in the definition of social conflict provided by Lewis A. Coser, where social 
conflict is defined as: "(...) a struggle of values and claims to scarce status, power and 
resources in which the aims of the opponents are to neutralize, injure or eliminate their 
rivals." (Coser 1956, 8). I will use this definition, though I will only use conflict as a term, and 
not social conflict, since that distinction does not provide any additional understanding for the 
issue of the IC-nexus in this context, even though it is to a large extent social conflict that is 
the matter discussed throughout this study. This choice is based on that since one of the issues 
with the IC-nexus is that there have been utilized an excess of concepts when approaching this 
nexus, if social conflict were to be used, other types of conflict which could be relevant to the 
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IC-nexus could by this premature reduction of abstraction, in the context of this thesis, lead to 
problems similar to the ones which are here trying to be solved, or at least confronted. In 
addition, the specification of scarce in the citation above is not a specification that is 
transferred into the understanding of conflict in this thesis. This instance of definitional 
modification is by the way, based on a concrete method in political theory, where 
modification of definitions and applying different understandings can be done through 
reconstruction of the content of writings when interpreting texts (Blau 2017, 251) which will 
be used in some instances in this thesis. This methodical specification will be returned to in 
the chapter for the methods in political theory, but is also mentioned here, since it is a position 
where the actual method is utilized. 
 
The division of the concept of conflict is made into its two subsections, i.e. into its two sub-
dimensions, where this understanding of conflict will be, and more, needs to be divided into 
violent and non-violent conflict. This is essential to some of the issues that seem to be part of 
the problem for why studies of the IC-nexus produces varied empirical results, where the non-
violent dimension of conflict seems to sometimes disappear. It could be considered that the 
ignorance of non-violent conflict is a natural consequence of its nature, or maybe rather a 
consequence of the nature of the opposite concept of violent conflict, since violent conflict 
through its distinct nature usually is easier to detect and identify, and thus lures as a mirage of 
truth in the distance for the empirical scientist, and consequently finds its way into different 
kinds of research. Either way, this means that as a conceptual tool for this thesis, conflict is 
divided into two subsections which is violent conflict and non-violent conflict. 
 
The final concept that is found worthy to get its own demarcation here, is the concept of 
optimal inequality. This is a concept presented here to distinguish the point of where at the 
scale of inequality the optimal point of inequality is found, and is called so because it is 
considered to provide an optimal output for a society and its members when inequality is 
located at this position. This is a point which is here considered more productive for all the 
members of society than absolute equality which as pointed out is equal to the war of all 
against each other. And as shown in Model 1, the optimal point is placed closer to absolute 
equality than to absolute inequality. 
 
It should be noted at this point, to reduce possible confusion of this concept that there exist 
also: "(...) an optimum level of income inequality (...)." (Parvin 1973, 281), which is not the 
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same concept though similar at certain points, but the optimum level of income inequality 
points to an economical effect (Parvin 1973, 281), where optimal inequality does have a 
broader approach, and there exist some other differences in the understanding of the function 
of increase in equality from the optimal level, where an optimum level of income inequality 
supposes increased levels of conflict when it approaches equality (Parvin 1973, 281), which is 
not supported in the understanding of optimal inequality, where the level of conflict is 
constantly increasing based on increased inequality, and reduced the other way around. 
 
A small note on the term of equality here is that the reason for including absolute equality, 
and not only use equality when referring to the extreme left side of the scale of inequality is to 
connote a diametrically opposite of absolute inequality. But in principle, equality and 
absolute equality are consider equals because any change in equality beside absolute will be 
understood as a gradation of inequality. This is done even though I trespass the rule of not 
treating different concepts as equals, by specifying that the left extreme of the scale of 
inequality, absolute equality is used as the term for this position of the scale. But I trespass 
this rule by providing an explanation of this infringement, and it provides a distinction which 
makes the scale of inequality easier to comprehend by giving it increased clarity. So the dual 
use of equality and absolute equality is just to simplify the cognitive utilization of the scale of 
inequality, and equality will be the term most applied in the text, but as mentioned, the 
concept of equality and absolute equality are in this thesis in all but name identical. 
 
The concept of optimal inequality will be developed throughout the discussion of the IC-
nexus in this thesis, but it is judged here that it is necessary to present a preliminary 
understanding of the concept already here. And as mentioned, this concept can be found 
connected to other already available ideas, though under other names than optimal inequality 
which is constructed for the purpose of this thesis, where the choice of the word optimal is not 
a coincidence, but is deemed to provide a specific understanding of this level of inequality in 
a society. But before the ideas behind optimal inequality is pursued, I want to pause on the 
output of social cooperation, since this is closely related to the concepts used in this thesis and 
the understanding of the IC-nexus, and is needed for the continued explanation of the content 
of the concept of optimal inequality. 
 
John Rawls in his work concerning justice writes that: "(...) principles of justice deal with 
conflicting claims upon the advantages won by social cooperation; (...)". (Rawls 1971, 16; 
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emphasis added). In my own thesis when evaluating the IC-nexus, it is not justice which is of 
interest, or any sort of just division and distribution of the advantages won by social 
cooperation, but the rather the advantages in themselves and the maximization of those 
advantages. These advantages, i.e. the advantages won by social cooperation will from this 
point in this thesis be referred to mainly as the social product, as done by Jørgen Pedersen 
(Pedersen 2019, 28). The focus in this thesis is more concerned in from where the foundation 
of which principle of justice originate, in that these principles have to originate in a concrete 
understanding and precise conceptualization of the mechanisms of social cooperation (Rawls 
1971, 9-10). But the social product relates to both approaches, i.e. just and actual distribution 
of the social product, and the focus in this thesis is foremost on the actual distribution of the 
social product. 
 
To repeat and specify on this matter, the social product is advantages won by social 
cooperation, which individuals by themselves cannot produce since the social product is won 
by advantages which emerges from cooperation. I.e. the social product function as a sort of 
surplus won by the social cooperation. It is the mechanisms behind and related to the actual 
distribution of the social product which is the basis for the theorizing in this thesis, through 
theorizing about, and clarifying the concepts of the IC-nexus. Even though the concern is here 
of the actual distribution of this social product, indirectly it can relate to just distributions as 
well, since as specified above the understanding of just distribution of the social distribution is 
based on the mechanism for actual distribution. But any just distribution of this social 
product, or mention of it will in this thesis mainly only be included if it can contribute to 
explain the dimensions and the functions of the IC-nexus. 
 
To return to optimal inequality, now with the concept of social product available, the point of 
optimal inequality is considered to be positioned at the scale of inequality where the available 
amount of the social product is maximized. The availability relates to that the social product 
at this point is not tied up to a specific type of application, for example by keeping the 
operating social system in place, which here also includes the political and economical 
dimensions of a society. Thus if a group of individuals arranges themselves in a form of 
societal cooperation to be able to generate a social product, the available social product will 
when striking the point of optimal inequality be maximized, but while passing the point of 
optimal inequality, both ways, going up or down, on the scale of inequality, the available 
social product will be reduced. The idea behind this function is based on inequality's relation 
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with conflict, i.e. the IC-nexus and a central idea to the theorizing about this nexus in this 
thesis, where the need for inequality for being able to construct a society and harvest its gains 
is limited to the level of optimal inequality. But is also tied to conflict, and any further 
increase in inequality in a society from the optimal point will not increase the social product 
more than the resources needed to handle the extra conflict in society which rises in cahoots 
with inequality, when the most influential advantages of social cooperation is already 
achieved, e.g. like structuring the society in a hierarch and utilizing division of labour. 
 
As mentioned earlier, the concept of optimal inequality is in itself based on similar ideas 
which have been expressed before, such as what Hobbes specifies in that there exist in nature 
other species than human beings, i.e. animals, which operates in social systems without the 
ability to discuss and evaluate the system in itself. They may also be considered to produce a 
social product which is a creation of natural forces, but they differ from humans in certain 
ways for example by not being able to separate between private and common good (Hobbes 
1996, 113). The notion here is that it lays the foundation for an understanding of optimal 
inequality, in that there exists a natural inequality which can naturally be found in social 
systems based on that these systems can provide an advantage for the members of that system 
in a way which will dispel other systems which harbours a form of natural inequality which is 
further away from optimal inequality. The optimal inequality is such that it is the optimization 
of the natural inequality, and another system cannot exceed this position of optimization, 
since it from that position just will approach either the position of absolute inequality or 
absolute equality on the scale of inequality, and as a consequence the amount of the available 
social product will diminish. This equation is done on an ideal level utilizing two different 
societies which, in principle, only differ in their level of inequality. I write in principle, 
because if the level of inequality differs, it should also influence the level of conflict based on 
the mechanisms in the IC-nexus, but for the sake of argument, they are ceteris paribus 
societies expect for the level of inequality. 
 
By the way, the reason optimal is a term used as part of this concept is not just to be able to 
create a new concept, but it rests on the idea that this position of inequality in a society is 
optimal for the combination of the collection of collective resources, i.e. resources which 
surpass what individuals alone can produce, together with a minimum level of conflict which 
in this thesis is seen as constantly rising with the increase of inequality. And it is considered 
to be a premise which can function as a clarifier for theorizing done in this thesis. 
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This all together means that optimal inequality consists of an idea which is consistent with a 
moderate level of inequality in the distribution of resources and opportunities in a society to 
achieve the main functions of social cooperation. When those goals are reached, continued 
inequality does not yield equal returns as it does in the first stages of social cooperation, and 
the effect of the IC-nexus kicks in and overwhelm any gains from further cooperation through 
increased conflict. This cooperation creates the social product, as seen above is the excess 
product of social cooperation which the individuals by themselves cannot produce, and where 
the point of optimal inequality identifies where on the scale of inequality a society needs to be 
to be able to maximize the available social product. And in the event of any regression or 
advance from that point, the social product will in itself be reduced or even increased, but, the 
effect of the IC-nexus will eliminate any increase in the available social product, and any 
reduction indicates less resources and opportunities to distribute in the society. 
 
To summarize: For the three concepts presented here, inequality, conflict and optimal 
inequality, inequality is divided into opportunities and resources. Conflict is divided into 
violent- and non-violent conflict, and optimal inequality is the position of inequality which is 
preferable to have for any society to maximise the available social product while at the same 
time keeping conflict at a minimum. Model 2a and Model 2b below visualises the concepts of 
inequality and conflict, with reduced level of abstraction into opportunities and resources for 
inequality and into violent conflict  and non-violent conflict for conflict. Optimal inequality is 
shown above in Model 1, and will also be available in the closing chapters of this thesis in a 


















Model 2b: (Including potential categories for the mid-level dimensions). 
 
 
Now having presented the concepts and arguments for conceptualising the concepts, the 
attention turns to discuss political theory, by highlighting political theory's contemporary 
standings and recent developments in the field of political theory and its application for this 
specific study of the IC-nexus. 
22 
 
Chapter 3: Political theory in political studies 
 
The reason that the field of political theory has been chosen in this thesis as the appropriate 
approach for the effort to try to increase the understanding of the IC-nexus in the more 
general field of political studies, is mainly because it seems that purely scientific advances 
haven't been able to provide a satisfactory result by testing and retesting spectres of the nexus, 
as indicated in the chapters above. The understanding here is that political theory has the 
capacity to go beyond empirical results in a way that science cannot. This will be shown 
through this and the next chapter. One of the reason for the lack of conclusive results in the 
empirical testing of the IC-nexus is in this thesis considered to be due to the neglect of the 
field of political theory in political studies, and this also include a neglect of political 
philosophy, which is closely connected to political theory at least in its original meaning 
(Cavarero 2004, 55). Though the direction of political philosophy is not an approach which 
will be pursued here as a separate approach more than providing a supportive role to enhance 
the understanding of the IC-nexus when theorizing about the nexus, when and if found 
necessary. In addition, these two fields, i.e. theory and philosophy tend to overlap, so the 
distinctions between them is here not seen as an absolute division, but more of a practical one. 
It is more included as a distinction because it exist in the literature of political studies and is 
considered practical to have this distinction available to refer to, to enhance some different 
aspects in political studies, as in this instance to discuss changes in how politics has been and 
is being studied, when emphasising the role of political theory. 
 
The need for the inclusion of political theory, and even more, the need for pure equality 
between all the fields inside the study of politics, i.e. political science, political theory and 
political philosophy, is here considered to be an indispensable approach to be able to discover 
the political reality. To advance only with the use of science seems unsatisfactorily, as the: 
"(...) political life is often as opaque as the rest of social life, (...)." (Moon 2004, 14), and to 
apply an one-dimensional approach by primarily using science to uncover the true character 
of politics seems insufficient. 
 
James Tully argues that in the history of political studies, through the three different genres, 
of either science, theory and philosophy, there have existed different approaches and different 
understandings of which genre that can supply the better understanding of politics, which has 
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contributed to an continued debate about what political theory really is, but it is difficult  
arrive at a unison understanding of this matter since: "Because there is no definitive answer, 
there is no end to this dialogue." (Tully 2004, 80). I find the use of the term dialogue of the 
debate of what political theory is, and how it relates to science and philosophy as a very 
diplomatic choice of words, since it often seems as polemics is the more utilized approach 
when discussing how the studies of politics should be conducted, which may be by some 
considered that this thesis has the tendencies to take the latter approach. Even if that may be 
the case, the purpose here is to highlight how through its use and support how political theory 
can provide for an expansion of the understanding of politics through the emphasize on 
theory, which partly also includes political philosophy, though not so much used here, or at 
least its use is not demonstrated too much in this thesis. And the stress on the insufficiency of 
using science alone to understand politics is not to undermine the scientific approach, because 
as indicated, for this thesis the different ways to studying politics through science, theory and 
philosophy are considered equals even though they are different and are, even more, 
considered complimentary, in a way that they together provides the more suitable instrument 
to understand politics, which they exclusively and on their own seems unable to provide. 
 
The choice of using political theory as the approach for the research done in this study is 
connected to the results from the scientific studies of the IC-nexus where the excess of 
concepts in use and the diverging results was considered to not provide satisfactorily 
guidelines for continued empirical testing of the nexus. And since there exist several different 
ways of studying politics and no common agreed upon answer to decide which approaches 
that should be preferred (Tully 2004, 80), the choice of political theory is considered the most 
reasonable approach to take on this occasion to contribute in the effort to understand the IC-
nexus. 
 
If today there exist a clear separation of political studies, even if how this division should be 
understood is not agreed upon, the division between the three main fields in political studies, 
i.e. the scientifically, the theoretical and philosophical, was at an earlier point considered 
more like gradations of a united field of political studies than separate fields of inquiry, where 
students on politics would use the combined approaches from these subsections of political 
studies as was considered appropriate (Alexander 2018, 404). From this earlier unison 
approach it is possible to extract a picture of the evolution of political theory, at least from the 
point where the traditional unison approach was challenged. 
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George Alexander has done this by presenting an genealogy of political theory where he 
uncover four different types of modern political theory which emerge from a traditional 
canonical form of political theory. The four modern types of political theory he identifies are 
positive, normative, third way and sceptical, and he also include the traditional form, which is  
a fifth type, found in the canonical approach which is considered the original type of political 
theory which is the common foundation for the four modern types (Alexander 2018, 403). 
 
Alexander writes that the break from the unison study of politics, to what we now know as the 
more familiar tripartite division, occurred in the early twentieth century from the then 
dominating canonical approach, i.e. the original type of political theory as the predecessor of 
the four modern types, which based political theory in classical political literature, organized 
into a whole canonical foundation in the nineteenth century, and where the approach to the 
subject was solely based on: "(...) reflection on politics in relation to a collection of great 
works, (...)." (Alexander 2018, 403-404). He also highlights that the reason for the break from 
the unison approach was based in a problem which emerged from the canonical political 
theory where it was confronted with some questions to which it could not provide satisfactory 
answers, and in a reaction political science, i.e. an approach which emphasised observable 
political activities, gained ground in a process which ended with the suppression of the 
canonical approach of political theory in favour of political science. One of the causes of this 
event for this displacement was that the canon was unable to provide satisfactorily answers 
since it was: "(...) full of antiquated discussions." (Alexander 2018, 405-406), which is 
comprehendible when knowing the immense political changes that had occurred in the latest 
centuries before modern times, and that all political issues that arise from new political reality 
could be handled by identifying discoveries of political mechanisms from past times seems 
challenging. But by excommunicate the canonical political theory, a side effect may also be 
that one risk to ignore insights and ideas which had influenced and to a large degree had 
shaped the foundation for the modern political situation. Though, as Alexander continues, in 
the situation where science narrowed the field from a more unison approach to political 
studies, and tried to expel the influence of political theory, this did not hold over time and the 
ban on political theory had to be lifted through necessity, because this exclusive approach did 
not work out either since: "(...) eventually political scientists were to realise that they, too, 
were theorist." (Alexander 2018, 406). This is also at the point from where the modern forms 
of political theory that Alexander identifies starts to evolve into their more distinct types of 
political theory. The four types modern political theory that he has distinguished have some 
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distinct characteristics and influence. But even if each type of modern political theory has its 
own characteristics, they have also a common denominator which is based in that they all are: 
"(...) successive fragmentations of and restorations of lost parts of a canonical political theory 
(...)." (Alexander 2018, 403-404). 
 
The first type of the modern types of political theory is the positive political theory. The 
positive political theory can be considered an offspring of the oscillations between the 
simultaneous exclusion of and need for political theory after the expelling of political theory 
in political studies, and a turn to the exclusive focus on political science. Political theory was 
at this time not become extinct, but had temporary been exiled to the realm of history. But 
when the scientific approach to political studies started to dominate the field in the early 
twentieth century, the need for political theory soon became apparent and by the mid-
twentieth century the realization that political science also had a theoretical dimension 
became clearer, and the issue of the division of political science and political theory became a 
revived issue in political studies (Alexander 2018, 406). The form of this first part of this new 
and first type of modern political theory took on a structure of a tool for political science, in a 
way that it explained mechanisms in politics through simplifications by using models and 
hypothesis to explain processes and causality, but without inclusion of the usual ought which 
tended to cling on to traditional political theory (Alexander 2018, 407). In this way it became 
tailored to the needs of the current domination of the political science in the field of political 
studies. But for the capacity of political theory in this form as only in the service of political 
science, it had some inherent restrictions, since: "(...) political science never really managed to 
make theory anything other than a tool of quantitative generalisation." (Alexander 2018, 407). 
This made positive political theory a form of theory which linked up with political science 
focused on inference of deduction and induction, centres on the is and excludes the ought, and 
have high levels of abstractions and lack imagination in the understanding of politics. This 
paved the way for another form of political theory which took on a less brute form than the 
positive form of political theory and which became known as normative political theory, 
which tried to combine a scientific-theoretical approach with a traditional type of theory in an 
effort to regain greater sophistication into political theory (Alexander 2018, 408-409). 
 
Normative political theory emerged in the second half of the twentieth century by locating a 
position in political studies which had been abandoned by the now dominating scientific-
theoretical approach which included the type of positive political theory, though this positive 
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political theory was an integrated part of political science and not distinct from it. The 
available location for the new type of political theory, by focusing on a normative approach, 
became available by concentrating on the ought in politics which included areas like ideals, 
values and principles (Alexander 2018, 408-409). Alexander highlights that the settlement in 
this available area for this new form of political theory was accepted by the dominating 
political science and its lackey of positive political theory because it did not try to invade its 
dominion where political science ruled, where the new type of normative political theory 
rather concerned itself with areas of how to understand justice and rights, equality and liberty. 
But since the positive political theory was integrated into political science, all approaches 
concentrating on normative political theory was confused with the complete field of political 
theory when it emerged, as: "(...), normative political theory laid claim to the entire 
inheritance of political theory." (Alexander 2018, 409-410). This equation of political theory 
with normative political theory is still currently the dominating view of how to consider 
political theory when undertaking political studies (Alexander 2018, 411), which 
understandable can lead to confusion when applying and working in the field of political 
theory. Though by normative political theory finding its place closer to the ought than the is, 
this type of political theory distances itself from a general approach to politics and are more 
connected with the legislative part of society. This again paved the way for another 
understanding of political theory, which is the third way (Alexander 2018, 411-412). This is 
also warranted, i.e. to try to include all types of political theory inside the field of political 
theory, since by hiding one type of political theory, i.e. the positive type, inside political 
science, and claiming the name of political theory for other, i.e. normative political theory, 
could easily lead to confusion, in instances when relating to the field of political theory, both 
from the inside and from the outside. 
 
Alexander writes about the third way of political theory that this approach is willing: "(...) to 
see politics in more than one way at once." (Alexander 2018, 413). But with the recent 
dominion of normative political theory and its confiscation of the whole field of political 
theory, the third way is an even more recent approach which has provided some novel results, 
but is too new in itself to have attracted any considerable critic (Alexander 2018, 414), and 
can be considered to be in an establishing phase which only time can decide if it has the 
possibility to find a place for itself or even seize territory from the two former modern types 
of political theory. Even if this form of third way political theory as Alexander presents seems 
more appropriate to incorporate elements of the two former forms, and has a closer link to 
27 
 
politics by having: "(...) emphasised power as an element of politics and emphasised the fact 
that theory must be political, (...)." (Alexander 2018, 414), he also provides a fourth type of 
political theory which he prioritize. He highlight that the third way may, and even expects, to 
change normative political theory, but he also specify that a criticism which can follow the 
third way is that it is liable to commitments issues by being too closely tied up to politics, and 
therefore suggests a fourth and final type, at least for the time being, of modern political 
theory which is the sceptical political theory (Alexander 2018, 415). 
 
The fourth type of modern political theory, i.e. sceptical political theory, tries to highlight the 
distinctions in political theory, where the others tries to pretend that there is only one type of 
political theory, which is provided through an unspoken assumption that political theory is the 
one type which it emerges from (Alexander 2018, 415). In this situation if one approaches 
political theory from one of the first three modern types of political theory, i.e. positive, 
normative or third way, and only refers to it as just political theory, this can easily create 
confusion, which is tried to be avoided here by clarifying some distinctions of the current 
active types of political theory, or maybe it is better to call it subsets of political theory as that 
seems more accurate of the current positions of the different types of modern political theory. 
 
For this thesis, and for the theorising done on the IC-nexus here, it is not taken an absolute 
stance on which type of political theory that this instance of theorizing emerges from since 
they are in flux, but it leans towards the sceptical type, though the aspects of division of 
positive and normative political theory is also supported here, but only as a subcategories of 
political theory proper, which maybe the sceptical type could evolve into. The reason I lean to 
the sceptical political theory, is because there is one particular aspect of this approach which 
is attractive and that is that this type is specifically directed to theorizing about politics, since 
it is: "(...) a type of theorising, unpolitical in its nature, which takes politics as its object." 
(Alexander 2018, 415). In addition of this, this type of political theory looks at theory, or 
rather theorizing as an endless process (Alexander 2018, 415-416), which is a position that is 
supported in this thesis, by that arguing that there exist no absolute objective to achieve a 
realization of truth through theorizing, but that the process in itself, i.e. the process of 
theorizing, can function as a supportive role which can function as a possible provider of 
guidelines both inside academia and outside in the world of politics, and as in the instance of 
this thesis, clarifying aspects of the IC-nexus by theorizing about it. 
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Though a challenge if one were to follow a clear approach of the sceptical type of political 
theory is that, as Alexander writes that it is not yet been established as a complete type of 
political theory, with the exceptions that it can to a certain degree be identified in past 
writings, and in one aspect regarding the original type of political theory, i.e. the canonical 
type, the sceptical political theorists tries to revive the findings provided there (Alexander 
2018, 417). 
 
Anyway, as mentioned, the position of which type of political theory which is followed here 
is not absolute though with a initial support of the sceptical type because some of its features, 
but the main support in this thesis is leaning to a broad understanding of political theory 
which includes aspects of both positive and normative political theory. This is because 
political theory current status is that it is understood in different ways, and seems to be under 
development of how it is understood with maybe some major alterations on its way, hopefully 
some paradigmatic changes. Though I find at this point little to gain by position this thesis 
clearly inside one specific type of these changing types of political theory, since this thesis 
tries to include insights from a broad understanding of political theory, and argue that political 
theory should occupy its own field which includes the necessary subtypes. Though the reason 
for including this section of the different types of political theory in this thesis, is because by 
clarifying these available types of political theory, it is considered that the understanding of 
this theorising can proceed in a more satisfactory way. In addition, this description of the 
current and former types of political theory provides a prelude to the next chapter in this 
thesis, which turn the spotlight over to methods in political theory. Since political theory is 
comprehended in several different ways, it is reasonable to expect some divergence in which 
methods that are most applicable, in that way that the different understandings of what 
political theory is can spill over into the methods of political theory, and influence which 
methods that are available. 
 
To summarize the discussion on political theory: The choice of using political theory as an 
approach in this thesis is based on that this approach provided opportunities to approach the 
IC-nexus from another angle than by utilizing a purely scientific approach. Political theory as 
a field seems still to be fragmented, as shown in the types presented above. The position of 
this thesis in political theory is leaning towards the sceptical type of political theory, based on 
some of its features. But the support for a specific type of political theory is in this thesis 
based on desire for a more unified type of political theory, though with the established 
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divisions as practical distinctions that can advance a pursuit for a unified broad field of 
political theory. I have focussed the discussion here on how political theory is understood and 
separated, and that political theory seems to be in a state of transformation, and its different 
types are mainly presented to remove potential for confusion, by hindering that the type of 
political theory utilized in this thesis is assumed to rely on a narrow understanding of political 
theory, which it is not. The stance of this thesis is rather an encouragement of the continued 
development of political theory into a more common framework, and a more united front for 
political theory would be welcome. If that is by wrestling positive political theory away from 
political science, combining it with the normative political theory and including aspects of the 
canonical political theory, maybe as three separate but related types of political theory could 
enhance its usefulness. And the contributing of this thesis to political theory is to operate 
inside its field, by performing practical political theory, i.e. actual theorizing about politics. In 
this way it may seem that the approach here is sceptical by leaning in that direction and by 
taking politics as the objective for theorizing, but the final outline for the general framework 
of the IC-nexus has strong positivistic tendencies, which makes the actual position of this 
approach of political theory hard to clearly distinguish in the available types. But by trying to 
clarify a sort of position and understanding for this thesis of political theory proper, i.e. a 
broad inclusive type of political theory, consist mostly of making sense of the capacity of the 
mind, through philosophy, in combination of the manifestations of the world, through science, 
and try to make systematic understanding of politics and how it works by combining the main 
faculties of our existence into clearer understanding, in this case, of politics, and more specific 
for this thesis, for the understanding of the IC-nexus. 
 
Either way, whatever continued development that contemporary political theory will take, and 
the actual position of this thesis inside the field of political theory may be partly indecisive 
based on no absolute positioning in  the available subtypes of political theory proper, the 
focus for this thesis is now turning over to available methods in political theory, that is all 







Chapter 4: Methods in political theory 
 
The available methods in political theory is coloured by the disruption of the field as a whole 
as described above. The divisions between the different understandings of political theory can 
be translated into the available methods because of this, as: "(...) political theory is an 
exceptionally wide-ranging and open-ended branch of scholarly enquiry, within which there is 
very little in the way of settled agreement with regard to questions of method and approach." 
(Leopold and Stears 2008, 9). This is an understandable consequence of the divergence of the 
different approaches and understanding of political theory. Why should the field of methods 
for political theory be in harmony if there doesn't exist a common agreement of what political 
theory is in itself? But a discussion of the methods is called for nevertheless, and maybe even 
more so than in other fields where the issue of method is more settled, (as if such a place 
exists). Maybe a consequence of this disruption of the field of political theory can be 
identified in the current situation where it is used. Since those who undertake efforts to utilize 
political theory usually remain silent when it comes to which methods to apply and often offer 
little reflection of how they are undertaking their studies, where a common approach is just to 
skip a consideration of method when theorizing about politics (Leopold and Stears 2008, 1). 
 
To try to battle this situation, i.e. to battle the situations where consideration of methods are 
not applied in actual context where politics is the object of theorizing, in this fourth chapter of 
this thesis, there will be present some of the methods which can be found in field of political 
theory, and that means here in all types of political theory. This choice is taken both to 
prepare the further discussion of the IC-nexus in the upcoming chapters in this thesis, but also 
to defend the already utilized approaches, as used during the presenting of the concepts of 
inequality, conflict and optimal inequality in the second chapter of this thesis, and by 
providing a context by describing elements of political theory. In addition to this, the actual 
implementation of methods and discussing them in a practical perspective is here also 
considered to be an essential part of clarifying which methods that works and which that may 
not work through its manifestation in research, and not just theorizing about the methods in an 
expectation that the methods will at some point reach a form of infallible existence. 
 
Even though as it is not my main intention to consider or contribute to any discussion about 
disciplinary disagreements between political science, political theory and political philosophy 
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in this thesis, by the very fact by positioning this thesis in political theory it can hardly be 
avoided. And political theory is here considered political theory proper, not one specific type 
of the divisions of political theory mentioned above, but rather using any available approach 
which seems appropriate, as is here seen as a reasonable approach as long as the field of 
political theory is in flux. Or at least a reasonable approach based on political theory's  
transformative state as it exist now in contemporary political studies, since if one were to 
consider to wait for the debate to settle on how to understand political theory one would 
probably have to settle in for a rather long wait. This is because political theory to a certain 
degree always is in flux (Alexander 2018, 402). So to present the available methods used, or 
at least present the methods which is considered practical to have available for the theorizing 
on the IC-nexus, it is considered here that it is necessary to return to the theme of disruption 
of the field of political theory, since that influence strongly the methods available in what 
kind of methodology they are founded. This makes political theory fluctuate between 
philosophical and scientifically methodology, which is here considered not a weakness, but a 
strength because it forces a political theorist, or at least should force a political theorist to 
think about how to think, which is a issue that often seems lost at least to purely scientific 
approaches (Sartori 1970, 1033). 
 
Since both science and humanities departments harbours political theory (Grant 2002, 577), it 
is not hard to understand that there can appear some disagreements in how to settle its 
position in academia. This is not only based on professional disagreements, but it has to be 
appreciated that there are established institutions where there is invested interests both 
individual and collective, so any reason to settle disagreements must also overcome the 
organic tendency to defend the domain in which it exist. In addition there can also appear 
some confusion in political theory, since: "(...) political theorists do humanistic research in a 
social science discipline." (Grant 2002, 578). This must be acknowledged in a way that the 
product of political theory must be evaluated with the correct type of methodology, because if 
not, findings may be discarded on incorrect premises. Though regarding that the usual relation 
of political theory up to the normative tradition, this may be considered a reasonable 
understanding, but as pointed out above, since the approach to political theory in this thesis is 
broad, and not only restricted to normative or the more scientific positive approach, it is not 
considered here that political theorist only do humanistic research, but can do humanistic 
research in their effort to theorize. And if the humanistic approach is utilized, it is essential to 
be aware that the methods which are available when doing humanistic research differ from the 
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purely scientific approaches. Though even they may diverge from purely scientific 
approaches, they are not erratically chosen as if any choice beside scientific approaches are 
irrational, but rather they: "(...) are interpretative and historical." (Grant 2002, 581). This does 
not mean that an empirical approach that are more related to political science should be 
disregarded in political theory, those results are a central component to political theory as a 
political theorist also should use the knowledge produced in political science through 
empirical tests of political mechanisms (Grant 2002, 591). 
 
Both political theory and political science have their aim at explaining the world of politics, 
and at sometimes the result can be incomplete (Grant 2002, 591), but that doesn't mean that it 
is worthless. As is indicated above, the actual implication of the use of political theory, and 
this can be regarded relevant to political science as well, is considered a part of its evolution 
and understanding, simply by quantifying its use beyond complex ideal theories and down to 
more practical related small scale use. Even so, political studies include both scientific and 
humanistic elements which are complementary, and where the distinction between the two 
may at some times be blurred, but it still exist. And for political theory, this entails that it has 
the option, and even more should apply the opportunities emerging from both approaches, and 
utilize the historical and philosophical possibilities this entails for the understanding of 
politics, and thus the humanistic issues concerning politics (Grant 2002, 590). This is also in 
the agreement with the here understanding of political theory proper, which tries to utilize 
both avenues for enhancing human understanding about an issue, by using both idea and 
matter to understand the mechanisms of the world, that is using both humanistic methodology 
and scientific methodology to understand the mechanisms of the world. And in this instance 
to make an effort to understand the mechanisms of politics by combining both sets of 
methodologies through the conductor of political theory. 
 
What the humanistic side of political studies can offer is that it is often concerned with 
reasonable judgement, where judgement is a necessary feat to apply when studying issues of 
the world, since the world often approaches us with reduced clarity (Grant 2002, 581-582). 
This approach could be of great assistance to understand empirical evidence. It is easy to be 
fooled by a notion that empirical evidence is self explaining, but the evaluation of empirical 
results can lead in several directions, as has happened with the investigation of the central 
component of this thesis, i.e. the IC-nexus. And an unguided application of science by leaving 
political theory behind, or trying to incorporate it as a concealed form of political theory as 
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happened through positive form of political theory, may rendered political science in a state of 
confusion, maybe especially when it comes to concepts. And by iterating over the same 
methods may not be a satisfactory approach to solve these kinds of problems, if the methods 
used are based on an insufficient methodology for the problem at hand. 
 
In the context for this thesis, the approaches thus are centred in political theory, with tentacles 
reaching over to both political philosophy and political science, or to humanism and science, 
or to idea and matter, in a manner that is judged to be most productive at this point while 
studying the IC-nexus. The way that it seems to be productive is that it appears that this 
approach is the most useful for this project, with the strength that this approach applies, while 
at the same time recognizing that: "Both demonstrative reason and empirical evidence have 
their limits." (Grant 2002, 582). The rationale for including this distinction is just to clarify 
the position taken in this paper and giving the methodological and methodical choices a 
framework, and at the same time, and maybe even more important, fending off any 
methodological and or methodical fanatics. 
 
Since there apparently exists some disagreement about what political theory entails, as an 
initiation of the methods, one understanding of what it is, which includes both scientific and 
humanistic tendencies is that political theory is a: 
 
 (...) practice involving systematic reflection on the character of politics, the causal forces 
 underlying political stability and change, the institutional frameworks within which certain 
 types of political activity are sustained, and, more normatively, the values or objectives that 
 political activity and organization might realize, and conditions under which they can be 
 realized (Philp 2008, 129). 
 
This understanding opens up approaches that can utilize both humanistic and scientific 
methodological anchored methods, since it contemplates both facts and values. As the focal 
point of this thesis contains the relation between inequality and conflict through the 
scrutinizing of the IC-nexus, it is considered as up until now pointed out that the avenue of a 
political theory in a broad understanding and any available methods found there is the most 
suitable place to centre this project. Especially since, related to the citation above, through this 
study the understanding of the connection in the IC-nexus is considered to be influential both 
on stability and change, institutional frameworks and underlying societal values. The reason 
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for me to exclude the word political when repeating the content of the citation above in this 
context, i.e. writing stability and change instead of political stability and change, is because it 
is here found that the inclusion of the term political to some degree can confuse the 
understanding of the underlying mechanisms at play, which is why the term is removed here, 
to not let it obfuscate a more complete understanding of the mechanisms that theoretically 
influence stability (read: conflict), through inequality in a society. I also turn the use of the 
concept stability into conflict here as I have mentioned I will at times do for conflict related 
concepts. This choice is related to the specification of concepts in chapter two, where conflict, 
as in opposition to stability or any related concepts that can take conflicts place, is the term 
used to denote this dimension of the IC-nexus. The reason for specifying this, beside the 
desire for unifying the concepts used on the conflict side of the nexus, is because the concept 
of stability is here also found to be too vague to occupy the conflict side of the IC-nexus. 
Alexis de Tocqueville writes that: "It is important not to confound stability with force, or the 
greatness of a thing with its duration." (de Tocqueville 2009, 497), which indicates that it lies 
near to confuse the two concepts of stability and force. Especially may this be the issue of 
political arrangements, where long lasting regimes resides in power in what may seem as a 
stable society, though often supported by immense use of force. The understanding for such a 
condition in this thesis, is that this use of force constitute a situation of conflict, either violent 
or non-violent, and the use of the concept of stability may obscure this understanding, where 
it is also judged here that the concept of conflict doesn't carry the same capacity for confusion 
as stability. Thus if the concept of stability is used without the necessary alteration, this can 
provide continued fuel of the problem of using closely connected concepts which may not all 
be equally suitable, at least for the objective here of increasing insight in the mechanisms at 
play in the IC-nexus. Though at some points in this thesis, the concepts of stability, and also 
the concepts of instability are used, usually when referring to other sources, but the 
underlying understanding of stability in this thesis is the one depicted above. Besides, since 
there is made an amendment from the citation above to make it comply with the structure of 
this thesis, I find it relevant to repeat the point which was highlighted previous when 
discussing the definition of conflict, and that is that tool in political theory where one has the 
possibility to make necessary amendment through reconstruction of the content of text if 
found necessary, where Adrian Blau writes about this method that: "Reconstruction means 
testing and potentially supplying, supplementing, modifying or removing presuppositions, 
definitions, links between comments/ideas and steps in arguments, (...)." (Blau 2017, 251). 
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This method will also be utilized at later points in this thesis, as it has before and also here, 
but it will not necessary be mentioned every time this method is utilized beyond this point. 
 
Another reason for centring the thesis in political theory and thus influence the available 
methods, is because it widens the areas of research, as it is not restricted to politics, but can 
also apply insight form a broad range of academic disciplines, e.g. among others, history, 
psychology, sociology and philosophy (Philp 2008, 130). I will not utilize every option within 
this possibility, but it gives this approach the flexibility to include components of different 
disciplines which could be harder to justify in more rigid methodological frameworks. But 
still, it should be noted that by utilizing this broad approach of political theory, it is prudent to 
be vigilant when using two different methodologies, without automatically mixing them into 
one common methodology which may make the result of the theorizing inadequate. Or at least 
be aware that there are two methodologies at play at the same time. 
There are several available approaches or methods used in this thesis, and I will attempt to 
apply the methods that I find most productive in gaining insight in the IC-nexus. David Miller 
argues that: "(...) even the basic concepts and principles of political theory are fact-dependent: 
(...)." (Miller 2008, 31), and where these facts validity depend on some kind of empirical 
investigation. And if it is shown that premises of the facts are impaired, than it is necessary to 
modify the premises or to discard the fundamental premises that support the facts that do not 
exist (Miller 2008, 31). The relevance to this study here, is that there is an underlying 
theoretical foundation that proposes some social and political mechanisms in the IC-nexus, 
which doesn't provide an unified empirical verification of the theory when it is tested, which 
provides a reason for approaching this relation with a conceptual view, where I find the 
methods of political theory more relevant to this endeavour more than an exclusive empirical 
approach, since that latter approach have not yet been able to provide conclusive results. 
Though the utilized approach has a scientific tendency, in which available empirical evidence 
can be utilized to search for reasons shaping a theory in that or this way, either by looking at 
some of the empirical evidence, or looking for the reasons for the inconsistency in the 
evidence. As is mentioned before, the lack of consistency of concepts when trying to 
investigate the IC-nexus in an empirical way seems to be an issue for not being able to solve 
the IC-dilemma. Though on this occasion, it is not the empirical evidence which is as much in 
attention, but the way the results from empirical investigations has been labelled with a 
surplus of concepts. And also the other way around, in how a surplus of concepts have been 
tested, and then compared as equal types of tests. 
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Another way to see an approach used by a political theorist is how Adam Swift and Stuart 
White sees it where they describes the political theorist as in some sort of opposition and 
relation to an actual politician, not only in terms as an academic enterprise, but as an 
undertaking which includes an aim to be more connected to real politics (Swift and White 
2008, 49). In this capacity one of the enterprises for the political theorist, one of the division 
of labour between her and the politician, here related to a normative tendency of political 
theory, is that she has the possibility, or maybe even the duty, to contribute to clarifications 
about how to distinguish different forms of arguments and other assessments of values and 
balancing of them. And it is possible for a political theorist to offer arguments of her own and 
convince others through argumentation and clarification (Swift and White 2008, 54). 
 
It may seem that I have repeated the division of political theory several times up until now, 
and I will continue to do so throughout this thesis. I just want to clarify that this is intentional. 
Since as shown above, political theory is understood in several different ways, and the 
different ways to see political theory is here considered subsections of political theory proper 
until the concept of political theory has been better sorted out, and its repetition of that 
division is here seen necessary to not let any provisional understanding of political theory 
seep back into the text. In addition, clarification is one of the main theme in this thesis, and it 
is here considered that clarification can be done by repetition. 
 
The reason for this thesis to centre the methods in political theory is partly an issue of the 
thematic field of study, but also as mentioned that it opens up for investigations into other 
fields, and thus also other methods, like political philosophy, where one method related to 
political philosophy is the analytic approach which stresses the use reason itself (McDermott 
2008, 11), it may be seen as a bit vague as a specific method, though David Miller is more 
specific about the kind of reason in conjuncture with political philosophy, where he assert 
that: "(...) political philosophy is a branch of practical reason - it is thought whose final aim is 
to guide action, as opposed to having a merely speculative purpose." (Miller 2008, 44). This 
approach can be considered connected to the presentation above between the politician and 
the political theorist, where it should not be the sole objective to speculate on terminology, but 
rather an effort to provide operational tools for politicians, and may I add scientists, 
philosophers and other theorists which can suffice to provide a common language across the 




Reason itself can also be used as proof in regards to utilizing formal analysis in combination 
with political theory, when providing axioms and deriving certain conclusion from those 
axioms through consistent reasoning (Hirose 2008, 71), though this is not so much directly in 
practice in this thesis, but it could be an approach which could be utilized in an occasion of a 
continued use of a common understanding of the mechanisms in the IC-nexus, which as will 
be shown later, has the propensities to extract formal structures which can be used to test the 
nexus at a later stage based on efforts made here with the objective to produce an outline of a 
general framework for the IC-nexus. 
 
Though by using reason, it should be mentioned that reason is also connected to its 
contemporary reality which implies some restrictions on pure reason by the reality it exist in, 
and a critique of reason is that it can never become an instance of pure reason, but it lives in a 
space between ought and is, between facts and values, and this complexity should not be 
disregarded but rather included in an instance of using reason (McNay 2008, 85-86). By 
including this restriction, that pure reason is just an ideal, doesn't necessarily has to be a 
weakness as long as it is acknowledge during its use that these restrictions exist. And this is 
maybe a field where a broad type of political theory can make contributions, in not being 
restricted to either scientific methodology or humanistic methodology, but has the potential to 
discover insights in both genres. And even maybe more in a state of division of labour with 
actors of real politics, discover insights in the intersection between science and humanism, 
which may be where the core of political theory exist, at least that what is argued here that 
this is where the centre of political theory can be found, and even more, where it can flourish. 
 
Other methods, the methods of dialectic approaches are also connected to reason, though the 
dialectic approach is not a method that connotes consensus and there are many different 
understanding of this approach, where one of these understandings is based in the work of  
G.W.F. Hegel (Leopold 2008, 106-107), and according to Hegel it is the concept itself which 
is a basic foundation for the structure of reason, which also is a link between the sensible 
world and reason, which reason itself has created (Leopold 2008, 115). This would mean to 
have available clear concepts is a foundation for a dialectical approach, which has already 
here to a certain extent been provided, or at least made an effort to provided some distinct 
concepts, on the occasion of the explanation and clarification of the concepts of inequality, 
conflict and optimal inequality, which also is part of the endpoint of this thesis. But also other 
concepts or terms have been clarified, or clarified concepts of certain terms have been 
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included, among others through the dissection of political theory and its different types and 
with the mention of the social product and natural inequality. Other clarifications will also 
follow when it is deemed necessary. This is to be better able to discuss the content of the 
diverse concepts by clarification, and thus also make the concepts included clearer for any 
discussion of the IC-nexus. A note that can be practical to include at this point is that the 
rationale for not including every concepts that may be considered relevant to getting its own 
presentation in the second chapter, or in other chapters, is based on the increased clarity for 
those which have been included, by exclusion of others and limit the central concepts to a 
manageable amount. Other concepts which may also require a presentation will get a minor 
presentation at the instances where they are presented when the current context requires it. 
 
When mentioning the inconsistencies in empirical evidence it is appropriate to mention and to 
be aware of the distinction between ideal and non-ideal theory, as some of the abstraction 
levels included in my own discussion are at an ideal level, one has to acknowledge that our 
worlds societies are rarely ideal (Swift and White 2008, 58). As is the case with the concept of 
optimal inequality, it is set at an ideal level, though not an unachievable level, but it is 
presented more as a goal to give direction more than a goal to be realized. This is also an 
approach that John Rawls points out to that an ideal can be a foundation for clearer 
understanding of underlying matters, and that: "(...) a deeper understanding can be gained in 
no other way, (...)." (Rawls 1971, 9). As mentioned when presenting the concept of optimal 
inequality, this is a concept which focuses on the foundation from where principles of justice 
originates, the idealization of the concept is created to achieve a deeper understanding of the 
mechanisms at play in society transferred to a political setting. So the gain from this 
idealization for this thesis is not to foremost provide a position of achievement for a society, 
but it is here more developed as a concept which can be used to explain the mechanisms at 
play in the IC-nexus by giving it a turning point of effect when inequality is either increasing 
or decreasing, in cahoots with conflict. Though it is relevant that the ideal theory also can be 
seen as a hindrance, if the search for the ideal just continues in an infinite loop without 
realizing that it is an ideal and usually cannot in practical terms be achieved. Especially if the 
division of labour apply between political theorist and politician the need for practical theories 
should be a clear, as it can probably provide more practical guidelines for of implementation 
of real politics (Swift and White 2008, 60). So while both non-ideal and ideal theory have 
their advantages, it should be acknowledge that they have certain distinction, and to a certain 
degree have diverging areas of implementation and use. 
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In the next chapter, some of the fundamental theories which have been supporting studies 
regarding the understanding of the IC-nexus will be looked at, and in some occasions there 
will be applied some critique for either the theory or the application throughout the rest of this 
thesis. The intention of this handling of the different theories and use of them is to be able to 
highlight the mechanism of the IC-nexus, and even if some areas are criticised the intention is 
mainly to strengthen the theory which is under consideration, if not it will be stated clearly. 
This is because when it comes to theories, as Daniel McDermott argues, they exist to a degree 
on individual judgement, and not only scientific evidence, so a continued scrutinizing should 
be encouraged since theories can be considered a combination of ideas which help highlight 
certain aspects in the field that the theory is applied, and: "Assembling of a theory can be a 
very messy process, (...). Good theories, (...), can include problems, even inconsistencies." 
(McDermott 2008, 21-22). So in the event of evaluating and criticising a theory, this doesn't 
necessarily mean that this theory criticized is seen as a dissatisfying theory, but rather that it 
may have some gaps that can, on this occasion directly related to this thesis, be a source of the 
fragmented empirical evidence, which again can lead to incomplete understanding of a subject 
studied. This is a common theme with many theories, that they include some gaps, or even 
inconsistencies, and that the role of scientists is to try to fill the vacant space that these gaps 
provides (McDermott 2008, 22), and by that to generate a more complete understanding of the 
matter at hand, and in this case try to highlight some of the issues that may breed inconsistent 
empirical results. Since, typically, science is a place where agreement on specific theme often 
derive from repetitive tests of a theory and a consistent result gives us reasons for a higher 
credibility of the theory tested (McDermott 2008, 23-24), this can also be turned on its head 
and to say that inconsistency in test results based on the vantage point of a specific theory 
possibly will reduce the credibility of that theory. I will also add that it doesn't necessarily 
only have to be scientist which fill these gaps, but this can also be done through other types of 
studies, as theoretic and philosophical studies. 
 
This leads me to conclude this section of choices of methodological foundations and its 
methodical possibilities by centring the thesis in methods of political theory which emphasise 
reason and judgement, systematic reflections through clarification of concepts, reconstruction, 
disciplinary flexibility, while connecting these approaches to concepts and reality through 
clarifications as a ground to guide action, and trying to filling gaps in theories by theorizing. 
But the main issue to be taken out of this discussion of methods in political theory is the 
clarification of concepts. This should be an integrated part of every research enterprise, even 
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outside political theory, or outside theory as a whole and into science and philosophy as well. 
There should also be a certain degree of self-critical reflection in political theory and it should 
be done by the main tool of political thought which is language, which consist on political 
concepts, which is the container of meaning for political thoughts (Freden 2008, 198-199). 
 
A final note to this methodological chapter is that the structure of this thesis is done on the 
judgement that the structure used is the most suitable structure for this project. I.e. to provide 
clarifications of concepts and describing features of political theory, before presenting the 
methods of political theory. And further that the theories provided next are presented before a 
selection of empirical studies to evaluate some aspects of those studies. The specific argument 
for selecting a sample of IC-nexus studies will be returned to when the studies are presented. 
The final structural feature of this thesis it that it ends in a presentation of an outline of a 
general framework for the IC-nexus, with a subsequent conclusion. 
 
The specification of the use and the conscious use of concepts is the main theme for the 
methodical approach taken here, and this is also transferable to the next chapter of this thesis, 
which evaluates some of the main theoretic influences which have theorised on issues related 
to the IC-nexus, and which in various ways have influenced the way which the empirical 
testing following the theories have been conducted. Methodically how this will be done is that 
there will be tried to extract central elements of the theories as a foundation for theorizing. 
And a final note before continuing, the practical theorizing done in this thesis is continuously 
done during this thesis, sometimes in some clear instances as with the introduction of the 
concept of optimal inequality earlier, at other times it is just small instances of the evaluation 
done on certain aspects, usually related to empirical studies, concepts or theory. 
 
Chapter 5: Theoretic overview 
 
The theoretic overview presented here is thematically divided into two sections. The first 
section consist of a theoretic framework, where the aim is to highlight some central 
components connected to theories and thoughts related to the IC-nexus. The second section of 
the theoretic overview consist of a theoretic foundation, where the central theories which have 
influenced both theoretic understanding and empirical tests of the IC-nexus are presented, in 
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addition to an introductory part on some aspects of the relevant conflict theories. The two 
main sections are in themselves divided into four and six parts. The first section, which is the 
theoretic framework consist of four parts which highlights components which have been 
found relevant to present to provide a better basis for discussing and evaluating the actual 
theories. The second section, which is the theoretic foundation, consists mainly of the actual 
theories and writings on the mechanisms in the IC-nexus and are divided into six parts. A note 
I find reasonable to include at this point, is that this two part division of the theoretic 
overview must not be confused with the two part outline of the general framework for the IC-
nexus, which will be presented as a central result in the closing chapters of this thesis, as they 
occupy different functions in this thesis, but utilizes some similar terminology. 
 
The theoretic framework, which is utilized in this thesis for the IC- nexus (inequality-conflict) 
relevant theories, consist in itself as mentioned of four parts. The first part of this theoretic 
framework highlights a division in the school of thoughts regarding collective human 
interaction, where this division between the two schools of thought regarding human 
interaction is based on conflict or consensus, that is, if social interaction is based on 
competition or cooperation (Hayward 2015, 589). I will return to elaborate on each part of the 
theoretic framework and each part of the theoretic foundation of this theoretic overview, after 
the theme for each of the four parts of the theoretic framework, and the theme of the six parts 
of the theoretic foundation have got a short introduction. The second part of the theoretic 
framework shows one underlying theoretic implication with the possibility to influence the 
understanding of the IC-nexus which is based on the understanding for human action, where 
the focus is on premises for the causes of human action. Since it will in this thesis be followed 
the logic from the school of conflict, it will here be focused on two central ideas for the cause 
of human actions based on this direction of thoughts. This idea consist of a division into two 
types of actors which are the Deprived Actor (DA) and the Rational Actor (RA) (Lichbach 
1989, 455). In the third part of the theoretic framework it will be specified a component which 
focus on the division of individual and collective dimensions of the IC-nexus, which is 
conceptualized through the concept of vertical inequalities (VOI) and horizontal inequalities 
(HOI) (Stewart 2002, 3). This division of vertical inequalities and horizontal inequalities is 
the same division which was introduced as individual and collective/group inequalities in the 
introduction, where vertical inequalities are the same as individual inequalities, and horizontal 
inequalities are the same as collective/group inequalities. The reason for not introducing the 
concepts of vertical and horizontal inequalities already in the introduction when the issue of 
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individual and group inequalities were mentioned in relation to the recent development of the 
empirical testing of the IC-nexus, was because it was deemed not to be practical to introduce 
it at that point. The fourth and final part of the theoretic framework consists of a short 
presentation of the lineage of the IC-nexus in political theory to demonstrate that thoughts of 
the IC-nexus have deep roots inside the field of political theory, and thus to show that origin 
of the IC-nexus is not a recent innovation in political thoughts and theory. 
 
The second section of the theoretic overview, i.e. the theoretic foundation, starts with some 
aspects of conflict theories before continuing on a view on the writings of Alexis de 
Tocqueville by extracting some ideas of inequality and conflict based on his thoughts. Then 
components of central ideas inside Marxism will be highlighted. Then of a short mention of 
ethnical conflict theory will follow, and then a view on structural conflict theory will be 
presented. The relative deprivation theory is the final theory that will provide the theoretic 
foundation for the content of this thesis. It can be mentioned at this point that all these 
theories may not directly be classified as IC-theories, maybe with the exception of the relative 
deprivation theory which will figure as the last theory of the presentation, but they all have 
components which will be utilized in the subsequent discussion and evaluation of the theoretic 
foundation of the IC-nexus. Thus some of these theoretic directions are more concrete 
theories than others, and some are more writings where theoretical assumptions have been 
derived from the text and utilized in providing insight for the understanding of the IC-nexus. 
 
Section I: Theoretic framework 
Part I: Conflict vs. consensus 
 
In this study, the focal point is in principle continuously on the IC-nexus, though at 
sometimes to highlight premises for the IC- nexus the attention will at sometimes be steered 
in other directions. At this point in the thesis, this undertaking will turn in the direction of 
conflict theories, and the presentation of the theoretic foundation will be placed in the body of 
conflict theories. Though as mentioned above, it is here considered practical to also provide a 
theoretic framework for the following theoretic foundation. In this first of four parts of the 
theoretic framework, it will be presented some thoughts of a division which is prevalent in 




A general understanding of collective human interaction in the academic community is first 
and foremost divided into a dichotomous division, where it emerges from a partition of how 
human societies are understood and if functional human social relations are in essence either 
are based on conflict or consensus. The traditional understanding of these concepts of how 
human societies function has had an approach that divided the conflictual and the consensual 
as two opposing entities (Hayward 2015, 589). Though more recently, the main dichotomous 
division has been challenged, and the understanding of these schools of thoughts has made 
advances in appreciate that the two lines of theory for collective cooperation is more seen as 
mutual elements of a working society (Hayward 2015, 589). The theoretical trail which is 
tracked in this thesis is that it is based in the conflictual understanding of how productive 
human societies works. The reason for that is that first and foremost because the IC-nexus that 
is explored here is based in the logic of conflictual theories, and because the understanding in 
this thesis is resting on the opinion that the consensual view of a society is based on the threat 
of a potential conflict, and such that the underlying threat of conflict is the reason for the 
possible consensus. This is also an understanding that has been accepted by consensual 
theorists, though with a minor amendment in that consensus in itself can be a product of 
coercion (Hayward 2015, 590), and in this thesis with the perspective of the concept of 
conflict used in this thesis, coercion is just a type of, or sub-dimension of conflict, which by 
following the former introduced conceptual division of conflict for this thesis, can be found 
either directly through violent actions or more indirectly through non-violent actions. 
 
The central part of conflict theories is that these theories are based on the idea that society is 
organized through opposing forces vying for power. This is a prevalent idea saturating several 
positions of conflict theory based on ideas of divisions on like class, race and gender, where 
power and its distribution in a society determines social outcomes (Hayward 2015, 589). It is 
here considered preferable to repeat the concept of inequality used here in this thesis, since 
power will almost at all times be found as a component for determining outcomes of social 
interaction. And for this thesis, power is considered to be able to be identified in the 
intersection between resources and opportunities, which the division of inequality here 
consists of. Though it is also considered that all nuances of inequality can be found, at least in 
theory and especially in the context of this thesis, in either one of the dimensions which 
inequality has been divided into, i.e. resources and opportunity, or in the intersection between 
these two dimensions. This goes for power here as it did for freedom as mentioned before, 
and in theory should embrace all forms of inequality. 
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To shortly mention the opposing side to conflict theories before continuing, i.e. consensus 
theories, these theories provides an alternative understanding of the forces pushing for social 
interaction, and is based on interdependence between its partakers. In addition to this it exists 
a position that these opposing understandings of conflict and consensus can be combined, as 
is done through the idea of pluralism (Hayward 2015, 590), so in reality there exist more than 
two types of school of thoughts, but the conflictual and the consensual understanding of 
collective social interaction are the usual approaches. 
 
The connection to this thesis for including this division of conflict versus consensus as a 
theoretic starting point, beside it is providing a context together with the rest of the theoretic 
framework for the further evaluation of the IC-theories, is that this thesis has some underlying 
contract-theory tendencies, as exemplified earlier where the understanding of equality is 
based on an Hobbesian understanding of a war of all against all. 
 
Even though different understandings of the interactions between the individual and its 
society can be utilized by including the ideas from contract theories, the choice here is taken 
to follow the Hobbesian view. But as Rawls writes about using the ideas of contract theory, 
though in a context of moral theory, but I will claim that it also holds for theory in general, it 
is that the use of contract-theory and an initial situation implies certain levels of abstraction 
and forms a hypothetical situation (Rawls 1971, 16). The distancing of the state of nature and 
the state of society and how it should be understood, are essential components in the 
differences in the ideas from central social contract-philosophers also of other besides 
Hobbes, like Locke, Rousseau and Kant (Thommessen and Wetlesen 2002, 87-89), though the 
exact position of the state of nature and the social contract will not addressed here more than a 
presentation of the Hobbesian position as done in a former chapter, and a decision to follow 
that position. As it is a hypothetical situation, it is here considered appropriate to chose a 
position which makes sense in the context of this thesis and based on individual judgement. It 
is also here with the decision to follow the Hobbesian approach an approach which strengthen 
the decision to follow the conflictual premises for collective interaction, by highlighting the 
foundation for the understanding consensual and conflictual theories, and lay the foundation 
for the choice of the conflict theoretical approach followed here. 
 
The main issue will be to follow the IC-nexus, as it is throughout this whole thesis, and as 
presented, the logical step will be to utilize conflict theory as the basis for evaluating this 
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nexus. Though before turning to the theories, there are still some issues that need to be 
highlighted, which lead me over to the second part of this theoretic framework, which focuses 
on the position of the social actor, and the theoretic understanding of how she acts. 
 
Part II: Rationality vs. Deprivation 
 
Mark Irving Lichbach claims that one of the reasons for the inconclusive results from 
scientific investigations of the IC-nexus is that they are lacking: "(...) the assumption and 
reasoning that explain how and why inequality produces conflict." (Lichbach 1989, 434). To 
combat this deficiency it is possible to employ the understanding of one of two different 
approaches which can be found in either through the understanding of the Deprived Actor 
(DA) theories or through the Rational Actor (RA) theories (Lichbach 1989, 455). 
 
To start with the Deprived Actor theories, Lichbach argues that this assumption of action for 
an actor is based on relation to psychological mechanisms, that is that: "People's preference 
over rewards are (...) based on expectations about what they believe that they deserve under 
some ideal system of just rewards." (Lichbach 1989, 456). This implies some challenges for 
IC-nexus researchers, at least for empirical approaches, in how to identify people's 
expectations about what they believe they are entitled to under a just system. In addition to 
what an actor believe she is entitled to, the latter part of this proposition also involve some 
challenges of since evaluating what a just system is not just straight forward, and what justice 
is and the values it entails is not easily combined into agreement (Kymlicka 2002, 3). This 
means that the understanding of the Deprived Actor may be demanding when translating it to 
operational entities, but it can also be illuminating in understanding how human act and 
behave, at least at a theoretic level. 
 
Another factor which comes into play when using DA theories is that they have the aspects 
regarding deprivations related to other actors, and the understanding of the Deprived Actor 
can be understood in this intersection (Lichbach 1989, 459). Lichbach writes about the EI-PC 
nexus, which is the Economy Inequality-Political Conflict nexus (Lichbach 1989, 431-434), 
and writes about the Deprived Actors that they:" (...) care about relative income and wages." 
(Lichbach 1989,459). To adjust this proposition to comply with the concepts and terms used 
in this thesis, it will here be claimed that the DA cares about relative inequality, which more 
specific here based on the division of the concept of inequality for this thesis consist of 
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relative opportunities and resources, as in opposed to absolute types of inequality regarding 
opportunities and recourses. Lichbach does also specify the possible restriction of focusing on 
the EI-PC nexus and encourage researchers to expand the to the I-PC nexus, (i.e. inequality-
political conflict nexus) (Lichbach 1989, 467), though this proposition is advanced in this 
thesis to expand it all the way to the IC-nexus. And thus, to clarify, the EI-PC nexus above is 
in this thesis transformed into the IC-nexus, but shows one of the examples of diverging away 
from a common set of concepts to establish comparable tests of the IC-nexus. It could also be 
considered that in this instance, by focusing on the EI-PC nexus, the focus is in reality on sub-
dimensions and categories of the IC-nexus, and not on the overreaching relation between 
inequality and conflict. But to continue on this point will be a bit untimely to do here, since it 
is something which will be returned to when some of the empirical studies which have tested 
the IC-nexus is evaluated in the following chapter after the theoretic overview has been 
completed. So the attention here rather turns over to the Rational Actor. 
 
The other understanding of a social actor is the Rational Actor (RA). The Rational Actor 
theories were developed in response to the DA logic, since the DA theories did not provide 
sufficient empirical results (Lichbach 1989, 459). And in opposition to the DA theories, the 
RA theory propose that actors are more result oriented toward absolute outcome in opposition 
to results related to relative advantages. The Rational Actor lay more weight to what they can 
achieve in absolute terms, and are not concerned with these achievements related to other 
actors and their achievements, and a crude understanding of the Rational Actor is that she 
applies cost-benefit calculation (Lichbach 1989, 460). Lichbach writes about the Rational 
Actors that they: "(...) care about absolute income and wages." (Lichbach 1989, 461), and to 
convert that statement into the context of this paper, the Rational Actors care about absolute 
opportunities and resources. 
 
The picture of the two underlying assumptions which can be utilized when working with 
conflict theories is that the differences between the models applied to the actors is mainly a 
division between the difference of absolute and relative. It is understandable that the Rational 
Actor has been utilized in empirical investigations, since she appears to be more practical to 
apply when evaluating and undertaking empirical research, though the Deprived Actor may be 
an actor which is closer to the empirical reality. For example in economical models, the actors 
usually is based on an understanding of a Rational Actor because of its simplicity and eschew 
alternative theories (Andersen 2013, 164-165), though the problem may be that trust in the 
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results from such simplifications may be unwarranted by placing the assumption of the actors 
too far away from reality. 
 
Anyway, the two actors presented here, the DA and the RA is the two actors which is central 
to have available when evaluating the IC-nexus. The DA is also the model which is utilized in 
this thesis, and can also be found in several of the theoretic assumptions about the IC-nexus. 
Though this doesn't automatically exclude the RA, as it can contribute in its own way. It can 
even be considered that the DA is more compatible with theory by being closer to reality 
without the demands of empirical operalizations, and contrary, the RA may be more 
compatible with empirical tests, though has to pay a price by distancing itself from reality. If 
one probe deeper into the division between DA and RA, it can even be considered that this is 
a development of the actors from DA to RA, where a Rational Actor is more developed then 
the Deprived Actor through a development of autonomy, and the actual actors in the society is 
positioned on a gradation between DA and RA. For example does Immanuel Kant write that 
enlightenment is the development of personal authority, from a position of not just being an 
actor which reacts on the directions of others, and this lack of personal authority is sometimes 
easier to exist in than entering into the struggle of gaining autonomy (Kant 1993, 71-72), 
which may function as a basis for making gradations on the understanding of the actors, but 
could quickly lead to complications. Though even if that may be the case, the division of the 
DA and the RA will here be based in the traditional separate division of the two, and not a 
form of development of the actors from one type to the other. 
 
The presentation of the two types of actors, the RA and the DA seem thus mainly to consist of 
a division between the absolute and the relative. And the position of the Deprived Actor is the 
one that will function as the foundation of this thesis, and as pointed out may be the most 
suitable actor to use when making theoretic evaluations. This actor is also shown to be 
prominent in some of the available conflict theories regarding the IC-nexus. But if the actor in 
society acts alone or in cahoots, or rather, should be understood as an individual or a 
collective force is another matter, which is where the attention now turns to. And in the 
context of this thesis and the IC-nexus, it is how inequalities in a society is dispersed on either 





Part III: Horizontal and vertical inequalities 
 
The concept of horizontal inequality (HOI) and vertical inequality (VOI) is relatively new, 
where the former of these two dimensions has been a neglected dimension when, among 
others, referring to and dealing with inequality. The central difference between horizontal 
inequalities and vertical inequalities is that horizontal inequalities entails inequality on a 
collective level, while vertical inequalities points to inequality on an individual level (Stewart 
2002, 1-2). This relatively new dimension may provide the necessary nuance which to solve, 
or at least advance the understanding of the IC-nexus. Gudrun Østby identifies that this 
distinction between the horizontal inequalities and vertical inequalities can be, or she argues 
at least, that the lack of this dimension in earlier empirical research could be a contributor to 
the scarce results of the IC-nexus studies, though she points to the EI-PC nexus. In addition, 
she write that quantitative studies including this horizontal dimension of inequalities provides 
a positive link of the IC-nexus, which also line up with other results from case study research 
(Østby 2013, 206). 
 
The reason for the inclusion of the concept of horizontal inequalities and vertical inequalities, 
is because it is reasonable to infer that in an event of an empirical test of either of the 
structuring of the concepts, may present different results. Or at least it should be an issue to 
contemplate when performing empirical investigations. Even thought the focus of this paper is 
a theoretical one, this distinction is practical to include, because it makes the framework for 
eventual following empirical tests more complete. It is not here considered to be a theoretic 
substantial division between the two positions of HOI and VOI, but if one would have to 
investigate a relation between inequality and conflict, this dimension should at least be 
controlled for or demarcated to highlight which trajectory the empirical investigation 
undertakes. But it is here considered to be more an operational issue than theoretic, though it 
must be included into theoretic evaluations nevertheless to show that this aspect is considered, 
though it may also easily influence theoretic evaluations on some occasions. 
 
The final part of this theoretic framework for the theoretic overview is a quick tour into earlier 
writings on the IC-nexus, to show that the logic behind the nexus has long traditions in 
political theory, and this part will function as the steppingstone to probe into the more recent 




Part IV: Diachronic theories 
 
The starting point to the connection between inequality and conflict can be traced far back in 
time to ancient societies, where several influential figures have assumed or inferred that 
inequality in a society would facilitate conflict. This means that the connection between 
inequality and conflict is not a novelty, and the connection between the aggression which 
stems from these types of inequalities through types of relative comparisons are anchored in a 
long line of thoughts (Østby 2013, 208). It is not just the statements of certain ancient figures 
that connects inequality as a disruptive element in a society, but also the procedures that a 
society live by can show that inequality at some level is perceived as an unwelcomed force in 
society. In ancient Greece there were mechanisms in place that hindered concentration of 
power to a certain person or groups, by using lotteries for assigning offices to the citizens of 
the city, and in addition there were the possibility to ostracise a person into temporary exile if 
he grew to powerful (Vestrheim 2018, 23-24). This is an example of a manifestation of the 
understanding of inequality as force which society had to shield itself against. 
 
Besides the structure of society, some philosophers directly connected the destructive force of 
parts of inequality for a society. Plato, even though he promotes a society that is based on a 
congenital differences, he is still aware of the threat of unequal power between persons or 
fractions in society. He identifies that unequal distribution of the resources of the society 
would be dangerous for the stability of the society (Skribekk and Gilje 2000, 83-84). 
Aristotle, even though he and Plato have differences in their opinions in how a society best 
should be run, they still find some common ground in which their inferences are similar. 
Some of the equality that Aristotle promotes is that to avoid political instability, there has to 
be a possibility for everybody of the society to be heard. And in addition, contrary to Plato's 
idealistic state, the goal should be a viable alternative that could function in praxis, and then 
the middle-class should be the section of society that control the balance of power (Skribekk 
and Gilje 2000, 112). Although regarded with its current contemporary societies these ideas 
can be considered novel ideas, it is important to emphasise that these ancient societies of 
equals excluded certain groups of society like the slaves (Skribekk and Gilje 2000, 112). But 
this part of this thesis is mainly included to show that the idea of inequality in a society as a 
disruptive force is not an novelty. The distinction between Plato and Aristotle, where Plato 
highlights distribution of resources and Aristotle emphasize the possibility to be heard can 
also be connected to the division of the concept of inequality presented earlier in this thesis, in 
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the division of resources and opportunities, where resources equals resources and the 
possibility to be heard equals a form of opportunity. The inclusion of the middle-class can be 
traced back to Aristotle, a logic that resonates with class theories, holding that the size and 
role of the middle-class and stability is closely connected to stability. This idea of the 
balancing middle class has had a long lasting theoretical impact as it provides an idea of a 
balancing force of the classes in society (Mills1959, 259). And the middle-class can to a 
certain extent be seen as a product of a society which distribute its resources and opportunities 
in a way which lies closer to absolute equality than absolute inequality, related at this point to 
the scale of inequality. 
 
Other scholars have further specified that the assumption of the connection between 
inequality and conflict has deep roots in political theory. Jack Nagel writes that: "At least 
since Aristotle, theorists have believed that political discontent and its consequents - protest, 
instability, violence, revolution - depend not only on the absolute level of economic well-
being, but also on the distribution of wealth." (Nagel 1974, 453), and adds: "Contemporary 
political analysts have tried to test this ancient assumption using modern statistical methods. 
Their result are distressingly confusing." (Nagel 1974, 453). In these two citations, to pause 
on them for a moment, several of the grounds for this paper can be identified. Both that 
various types of conflict have been used, though far from all that are used when relating to the 
IC-nexus, and also the result of empirical testing of the IC-nexus assumption which leads to 
inconclusive findings are found in these citations. It could be claimed that protest, instability 
violence and revolution are not the same as conflict, though as pointed out in the introduction 
of this thesis to combat an excess of concepts used, conflict will in this thesis be utilized as a 
container for all types of societal disruptions, which either can be put in the dimension of 
violent, or in the dimension of non-violent conflict. 
 
Bruce M. Russet also signifies the historical theoretic relation between inequality and conflict, 
though he uses words as diversity of wealth and stable government (Russet 1964, 442), and 
William J. Linehan points to the same ancient connection of inequality and conflict, though he 
uses the words of economic inequality and political instability (Linehan 1980, 187). Here is 
shown both the connection to a long line of political thoughts on the IC-nexus, but also 
indicates the issue of excess concepts while studying the same mechanism of the IC-nexus. 
And since I will return to the empirical studies on the connection soon, and highlight the issue 
of concepts there, it is here considered enough to specify that diversity of wealth and 
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economic inequality is considered two instances of inequality, and stable government and 
political instability is consider two instances of conflict, though the first one in a reversed 
sense as it uses stability as the concept conflict side of the IC-nexus. Though, as specified 
before, that the concept of stability may easily be confused with force, but it also connotes to 
a certain degree a sentiment of the absence of conflict. How this is understood in this thesis, 
i.e. how it is understood that the capacity of the stability-instability relation at sometimes is 
used, is that stability shows low levels of conflict and instability shows high levels of conflict. 
 
Thus the connection of the IC-nexus is shown to be of ancient origin, and is still an active 
issue of concern for political studies. And already in this presentation of the lineage of the IC-
nexus, it shows that there is appearing several different concepts of this connection, which 
will be returned to and addressed more later, after a run-through of some of the most 
influential modern theoretical foundation for the understanding of the IC-nexus. 
 
This final part with the view of the diachronic theories concludes the fourth part of the 
theoretic framework of the theoretic overview, which provides the introduction to the next 
section which is the theoretic foundation of that same overview. In this next section, the 
attention turns first to some aspects of conflict theories and from there run through some of 
the main conflict theories that have dominated the area of the IC-nexus, by providing some 
insights from de Tocqueville, and by taking a view on Marxism, ethnic conflict theory, 
structural theory and the relative deprivation theory. 
 
Section II: Theoretic foundation 
Part I: Aspects of conflict theories 
 
There exist two relations which is prudent to present before continuing into the main conflict 
theories, which is based on a first relation between frustration and aggression, and a second 
relation between expectations and capabilities, as will be explained below. Østby writes that 
some of the theories related to the IC-nexus are Marxist theory, the relative deprivation theory 
and theories of ethnic conflict and structural inequality, where a common trait of these 
theories is that they have an: "(...) interpretation of conflict as a result of widely felt 
grievances among the relative disadvantaged in society." (Østby 2013, 208). There is also a 
link between these kinds of theories and individual psychology where Sigmund Freud pointed 
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out that frustration occurred whenever humans encounter obstacles in their pleasure-seeking 
or pain-avoiding activities, and when any such frustration is activated, the response is to react 
with aggression, usually at the perceived source of the frustration (Østby 2013, 208). It is this 
frustration-aggression-relation (FAR) that underlies the relative deprivation theory, which 
evolved in stages from a study of James C. Davies in 1962, and this theory was further 
developed by Ted R. Gurr in 1969-1970, where a second elements of the theory is based on a 
expectation-capabilities-relation (ECR), where if an individual's expectations for 
achievements are not synchronised with his capability to reach those achievements it may 
foster civil conflict (Østby 2013, 209). An concrete understanding of the frustration-
aggression relation is, as it was proposed by John Dollard et al., that: "(...) aggression is 
always a consequence of frustration. More specifically (...) the occurrence of aggressive 
behavior always presuppose the existence of frustration and, contrariwise, that the existence 
of frustration always leads to some form of aggression (Dollard et al. 1939, 1). 
 
With these two central aspects of conflict theories available, i.e. the frustration-aggression 
relation (FAR) and the expectation-capability relation (ECR), the further advancement into 
writings which has provided ideas or are complete theories which have figured on occasions 
of theorizing and in empirical tests of the IC-nexus is from here divided into five parts. As 
indicated some of what will be presented are in fact only writings which have been used in the 
understanding of the IC-nexus, and may not be a complete theory, but they will here for the 
sake of this section of the theoretical foundation for this thesis usually just be referred to as 
theories, even though a more nuanced separation of these theories could be warranted. But for 
practical reasons they are here, and throughout this thesis mostly referred to as theories. 
 
The setup for this theoretic foundation is as follows, in the remaining five of the six parts of it 
is first, (as the second part of the whole theoretic foundation), to present the theory of Alexis 
de Tocqueville, then Marxism figures as the third part. The fourth and fifth part will consist of 
a view on ethnical and structural theory in that order, and finally will the relative deprivation 
theory be presented as the sixth part, which also appears as be the most complete theory of 
these five theories, at least in the combination of the aspects shown above and the issues 
included in the theoretic framework. In addition, it is appropriate to mention that the relative 
deprivation theory is the theory which has figured in most of the studies related to the IC-
nexus (Østby 2013, 209). But the theoretic presentation here starts with the theory of, or at 
least the writings of Alexis de Tocqueville. 
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Part II: de Tocqueville 
 
I want to start the presentation of the main conflict theories with an inclusion of some 
thoughts from Alexis de Tocqueville, because he enhances and specifies the assumptions and 
qualities of equality, and he also identifies some aspects of conflict that is essential to how the 
dynamic of the IC-nexus is understood in this thesis. He includes both aspects of equality and 
inequality, which is to a certain degree the same, since it can be viewed as a continuous scale 
where absolute equality is at the one end, and absolute inequality is at the other extreme of 
that scale, as shown earlier in Model 1 with the scale of inequality. But in addition to this, he 
also provide arguments for that inequality is a foundation for the rule of aristocracy, thus a 
threat to democracy, and he also includes elements that makes it possible to tie his thoughts 
up to the reason of the relative deprivation theory, which is the endpoint of this theoretic 
presentation of the theoretic foundation. The prior elements of the theoretic layout, with the 
two schools of thought (consensual vs. conflict), the division of the two types of actors 
(deprived vs. rational), the two dimension of the IC-nexus (horizontal and vertical), together 
with the part of the diachronic theories to show that the thoughts of the IC-nexus have some 
pedigree, were mainly provided to give these more concrete theories some context to rely on 
through a theoretic framework, but it was also done to provide the ground for theorizing. 
 
The reason for why it is found proper to start the theoretic presentation of the more specific 
theories of the theoretical overview with de Tocqueville's writings, which is here done by 
viewing his study of the American democracy, is because it both provides a better connection 
to the diachronic theories which would be lost if one were to jump right into the more modern 
theories, though Marxism has some of the same qualities regarding that issue. But in de 
Tocqueville's case, he is closer to the diachronic theories in that regard that his writings is 
based in a society where slavery still was an active institution in his study of the democracy of 
the USA, as it were in the example with ancient Greece shown above, where any equality 
which is identified is related to a specific group of society, as in a horizontal division of 
society but in an extreme instance, at least seen with modern eyes. In addition is the thoughts 
of de Tocqueville found throughout studies related to the IC-nexus, which will be shown 
when returning to the empirical test on the nexus, and partly in this theoretic display. 
In the introduction on his dissertation of the democracy in the United States of America, de 
Tocqueville immediately identifies equality as an apparent element of the society in which it 
distinguished itself from contemporary societies, and not only equality, but the equality of 
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conditions: "(...) nothing struck me more forcibly than the general equality of conditions. (...) 
The more I advanced in the study of American society, the more I perceived that the equality 
of conditions is the fundamental fact from which all others seem to be derived, (...)." (de 
Tocqueville 2009, 31-32). But he is not a blind follower of equality as a cure to a society's 
problems, he just identifies it as an influential factor to strengthen a society, but it can also be 
a destructive force in some circumstances. This is shown in his preface to the second part of 
his writings on the democracy in America, where he turns thematically from the civil society 
to the political community of the USA. He writes, and warns, the reader not to apply him with 
the notion that equality as a panacea for a society's ills, but that it can have an influence on 
many aspects of societies:  
 
 I must at once warn the reader against an error which would be extremely prejudicial to me. 
 When he finds that I attribute so many different consequences to the principle of equality, he 
 may thence infer that I consider that principle to be the sole cause of all that takes place in the 
 present age: but this would be to impute to me a very narrow view. A multitude of opinions, 
 feelings, and propensities are now in existence, which owe their origin to circumstances 
 unconnected with or even contrary to the principle of equality. (...). I have not undertaken to 
 unfold the reason of all our inclinations and all our notions: my only object is to show in what 
 respects the principle of equality has modified both the former and the latter. (...). I was 
 persuaded that many would take upon themselves to announce the new blessings which the 
 principle of equality promises to mankind, but that few would dare to point out from afar the 
 dangers with which it threatens them (de Tocqueville 2009, 792-794). 
 
This equality peril is something that Marxism did not include, and soon will be shown makes 
limitations to that theoretic approach, but strengthen de Tocqueville's approach, since he is 
aware of this peril where he continues later on: "It must be acknowledged that equality, which 
brings great benefits into the world, nevertheless suggest to men (...) some very dangerous 
propensities." (de Tocqueville 2009, 830). The reason for this awareness of the dangers of 
equality, even though he is mostly, but not exclusively, its supporter, it is that it may render 
the individual powerless in several areas. He identifies that no one is more powerless or 
insignificant than the individual in a democratic community, but the state itself has enormous 
power in regard to its individual citizens (de Tocqueville 2009, 884). This is a point of 
individual powerlessness in several different aspects is something he returns to several times 
and which is a major threat from equality: "As in ages of equality no man is compelled to lend 
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his assistance to his fellow-men, (...), everyone is at once independent and powerless." (de 
Tocqueville 2009, 1296). 
 
Even though de Tocqueville is aware of the dangers of equality, the attention will here mainly 
lie in the beneficial features of equality, for they are substantial, though it was here considered 
prudent to include the precaution of that the extreme equalities includes dangers as well as 
does substantial inequalities. It is also productive to appreciate those limitations when 
considering practical implementation of measures to adjust the level of inequality in a society. 
In addition, a society of complete equality is assumed to be unattainable anyway (de 
Tocqueville 2009, 1029), so it would be a hopeless undertaking to try to establish principles 
for a society of complete equality with the intention of implementing them, so the attention 
will lie where the strength of equality lies. A. de Tocqueville also sometimes refers to 
democracy instead of equality, but it has already been shown that he applies the equalities of 
conditions with democracy, so it is implied that equality is a major part of democracy. And an 
additional note is that equality here is understood as a low level of inequality, not absolute 
equality, which is shown is considered unattainable. So when it is referred to equality 
throughout this review on de Tocqueville's writings, it is in this thesis considered to be the 
same as a low level of inequality, as shown and explained during the presentation of the scale 
of inequality, shown above in a former chapter in this thesis, and while referring to inequality 
in the same manner, it is pointing to high levels of inequality, even though that will not be 
specified every time equality and inequality is mentioned. 
 
One of the main strength of democracy, or in fact the strength of the democratic rule, which is 
reduced by a society of inequality, is one that A. de Tocqueville also identifies, and that is the 
possibility to activate all its resources (i.e. individuals and collectives in a society) with 
extreme low expenditures, since the will for the activity lie in the partakers of the community, 
not only in the government:  
 
 Democracy does not confer the most skilful kind of government upon the people, but it 
 produces that which the most skilful governments are frequently unable to awaken, namely, an 
 all-pervading and restless activity, a superabundant force, and an energy which is inseparable 
 from it, and which may, under favorable circumstances, beget the most amazing benefits. 
 These are the true advantages of democracy (de Tocqueville 2009, 466-467). 
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In our modern era, it seems that it is the economy that mistakenly has been credited the role as 
the engine of society, when it is not more than a result of a vibrant society. This advancement 
of possibilities to the citizens in a democracy, i.e. in a state of equality of conditions, is that all 
the individuals in the society are not forced to march into the field for a common purpose, but 
they are restless to adventure towards undertakings which promote themselves, and by that 
activity the state musters all her power without using a penny and which maybe in isolated 
cases can produce small benefits, but as a whole produces many: "The restless ambition 
which equality begets instantly takes this direction as it does all others. (...); and, although the 
results of individual effort are commonly very small, the total amount is always very large." 
(de Tocqueville 2009, 859-860). The strength of equality, is that it gives the members of 
society value, and they are not active in trying to use their faculties and energy to destroy their 
society: "Equality every day confers a number of small enjoyments on every man. The charms 
of equality are every instant felt, and are within the reach of all; (...). The passion which 
equality engenders must therefore be at once strong and general." (de Tocqueville 2009, 960). 
Here is also the basic for the proposition for the IC-nexus, where the equality of conditions 
may provide a general interest of conserving a stable society, where every man has something 
to protect, but a man without nothing has all to gain in disturbing any such condition: 
"Amongst civilized nations revolts are rarely exited, except by such persons as have nothing 
to lose by them; (...)." (de Tocqueville 2009, 460). 
 
At one point de Tocqueville presents an example of the difference in a system between a 
society of industrious equals and of idle state of unequals between the north and south in the 
USA. Where there were a general tendency for the northern states to apply hired men where 
there existed opportunities for personal advantage versus the southern states that utilized 
slaves as their main source of labour, and a continued tendency appeared between the two 
sections of the Union: 
 
 (...); but in the midst of all these causes, the same result occurred at every step, and in general, 
 the colonies in which there were no slaves became more populous and more rich than those in 
 which slavery flourished. The more progress was made, the more was it shown that slavery, 




A. de Tocqueville provides a concrete and visual example of this effect in a case with the 
examples of the state of Ohio and the state of Kentucky where the former is a free state and 
the latter is a slave state. He illustrates the difference between the two banks of the river Ohio 
that divides the two societies which is situated on each bank of the river: 
 
 Upon the left bank of the stream [Kentucky] the population is rare; from time to time one 
 descries a troop of slaves loitering in the half-desert fields; (...); society seems to be asleep, 
 man to be idle, (...). From the right bank [Ohio], on the contrary, a confused hum is heard 
 which proclaims the presence of industry; (...) (de Tocqueville 2009, 657). 
 
This example supports the idea of that a society of equals are more industrious than a society 
based on forced labour, and to a certain degree shows the gain of a society of equals versus 
the detrimental consequence for a society to base its structure on inequality, especially if it is 
pitted against each other, because then also the influence of relative deprivation applies. That 
is related to the deprived actor (DA), which evaluates his standings in relation with the 
situation of others, and not evaluate his standings in an absolute manner. And just to diffuse 
any notion that relative deprivation won't apply to both individual and collective relative 
deprivation, I argue that that is not to be the case. I may be accused for drawing conclusions 
between levels of aggregation, but when it comes to inequality and conflict, I will argue that 
the same effect happens on an individual and a collective level, this is because the passion of 
men are similar on both levels as: "The majority (...), like individuals, it has passions, (...)." 
(de Tocqueville 2009, 755). This is an issue which will be returned to in the later part of this 
theoretic foundation for this thesis when the focus turns to the relative deprivation theory. 
Though this point of evaluating a situation based on relation to other factors is a point that 
also is found in de Tocqueville's work, and he applies this to be a mechanism that is possible 
to find at every strata of society: "Moreover, there exists a singular principle of relative justice 
which is very firmly implanted in the human heart. Men are much more forcibly struck by 
those inequalities which exist within the circle of the same class, than with those which may 
be remarked between different classes." (de Tocqueville 2009, 676). 
 
It is also possible to enhance this notion with a similar example between the states of the north 
and the south, where we find an industrious democratic nation pitted against a stagnant 
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aristocratic nation based on inequality is something de Tocqueville identifies as a kernel of 
conflict between the North and South a few decades before the civil war between the parties 
broke out. When de Tocqueville portrayed the situation in the USA, he distinguished at 
several times the difference between north and south. One of these disparities which he 
identifies is based on a form of inequality, and he points to this as a possible cause for 
animosity between the two sections of the Union, or more correctly from his point of view, 
the cause of hostility between the two parties: 
 
 It is difficult to imagine a durable union of a people which is rich and strong with one which is 
 poor and weak, even if it were proved that the strength and wealth of the one are not the 
 causes of the weakness and poverty of the other. (...). The weak generally mistrust the justice 
 and the reason of the strong. The States which increase less rapidly than the others look upon 
 those which are more favored by fortune with envy and suspicion. Hence arise the deep-seated 
 uneasiness and ill-defined agitation which are observable in the South, and which form so 
 striking a contrast to the confidence and prosperity which are common to other parts of the 
 Union. I am inclined to think that the hostile measures taken by the Southern provinces upon 
 recent occasion are attributable to no other cause (de Tocqueville 2009, 727-728). 
 
Further, de Tocqueville touches upon the relative nature of this relation. He identifies that the 
South is not impoverished on an absolute level, but they suddenly are compared to a 
prosperous neighbour, which is even worse to accept when their used to be on equal footing:  
  
 But they [the South] believe themselves to be impoverished because their wealth does not 
 augment as rapidly as that of their neighbors; any they think that their power is lost, because 
 they suddenly come into collision with a power greater than their own: (...) thus they are more 
 hurt in their feelings and their passion than their interests (de Tocqueville 2009, 729-730). 
 
Finally, in concluding this part of the theoretic applications from de Tocqueville I want to 
provide some of the elements that he identifies from inequality as a threat to a democratic 
government. There are some different elements at play here, but the main threat is the rise of a 
new aristocracy. But not an identical one, but in semblance to the aristocracy found in the 
19th century, which in a new setting would be a new aristocracy adapted to its age. The 
creation of an aristocracy based on this logic is still possible in modern societies based on 
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inequalities in society: "I am very well aware that democratic countries contain no such 
persons [aristocrats] naturally; but something analogous to them may be created by artificial 
means." (de Tocqueville 2009, 1344-1345). The establishing of the new aristocracy will be 
aided by inequality of conditions: 
 
 (...) manufacturing aristocracy which is growing up under our eyes is one of the harshest 
 which ever existed in the world; (...) the friends of democracy should keep their eyes 
 anxiously fixed in this direction; for if ever a permanent inequality of conditions and 
 aristocracy again penetrate into the world, it may be predicted that this is the channel which 
 they will enter (de Tocqueville 2009, 1072). 
 
This is the warning that de Tocqueville displays, and his prediction is almost correct, but he 
has missed a minor distinction that he has already pointed out earlier in his dissertation, 
namely that commerce is one of the main interests in a democracy (de Tocqueville 2009, 
1060), and more, that: "In democracies nothing is more great or more brilliant than 
commerce: (...)." (de Tocqueville 2009, 1062), and all men, rich and poor are willing to 
undertake the promise of commerce (de Tocqueville 2009, 1063). In combining that thought, 
it is not the manufacturing class that will create a new aristocracy, but the commercial class, 
which are trading the farms, manufactories and any item they can lay their wealth upon. And 
this will be the effect of inequality, a new aristocracy of commerce, which also sees it 
profitable to sell a label of democracy to its population, which the population are free to apply 
on their government, almost whatever that government consists of. This threat is a continuous 
one, since it is necessary to gradually turn a democratic mind into a mind that accepts 
inequality of conditions and provide the foundation of a new aristocracy of commerce: "It is 
evident that nothing but a long series of events, all having the same tendency, can substitute 
for this combination of laws, opinions, and manners, a mass of opposite opinions, manners, 
and laws." (de Tocqueville 2009, 759), where the object of such an aristocracy is to use, not to 
govern the population (de Tocqueville 2009, 1071). And development and maintenance of an 
aristocratic institution is based on inequality (de Tocqueville 2009, 763). To be able combat 
this eventual re-emergence of a new aristocracy as the chief arbiter in societal affairs, de 
Tocqueville also includes a specific privilege that should be distributed to its citizens, which 
is education, and that education is one of a few roads to travel for a democratic citizen to keep 
his independence: "If at all times education enables men to defend their independence, this is 
most especially true in democratic ages." (de Tocqueville 2009, 1304-1305), and this 
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education must keep pace with the gratification of resources to be able for the population to 
not lose sight of the bond between personal fortune and collective prosperity (de Tocqueville 
2009, 1033-1034). Thus in a society of equal conditions there is a foundation of prosperity, 
where equal conditions consists of equal rights, education and fortune which in total consist of 
equality in the social condition (de Tocqueville 2009, 1235). 
 
By this it is possible to distinguish in regard to the IC-nexus, at least for the Tocquievillian 
view that the opportunistic side of inequality is a major part of a functional democracy at 
least, but which translates over to the resource side. This in a way that if all members of 
society have opportunities it will translate into that all members have some resources, and in 
addition this will also lead to that the resources cannot be monopolized into a few hands, but 
will in a way automatically be distributed in a more general way throughout the society (de 
Tocqueville 2009, 1211). 
 
To lead the theoretic foundation of the theoretic overview back on track to the issue which are 
under investigation, I will end this part with a direct relevance to my thesis with the question 
if inequality is a cause of conflict. Towards the end of his book, de Tocqueville writes:  
 
 Remove the secondary causes which have produced the great convulsions of the world, and 
 you will almost always find the principle of inequality at the bottom. (...). If then a state of 
 society can ever be founded in which every man shall have something to keep, and little to 
 take from others, much will have been done for the peace of the world (de Tocqueville 2009, 
 1225). 
 
He also later adds a condition when he says that he cannot seem to find a comparable society 
with which he is confronted with, but with a number of consequences of equal distribution he 
includes that: "(...), violence is rare, and cruelty almost unknown." (de Tocqueville 2009, 
1357-1358). And as shown with the concept of conflict used in this thesis, violence is a 
central component there, at least in the already conducted empirical investigations of the IC-
nexus. 
 
The final condition that I extract from de Tocqueville, which is the central point which 
support the theoretic stance taken in this thesis towards the mechanism of the IC-nexus. He 
identifies that there are some that attributes the cause of events to either special- or general 
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conditions. And that general causes are prevalent in democratic times and special causes are 
more prominent in aristocratic ages: "(...) –– unless indeed we consider as a general cause the 
fact itself of inequality of conditions, which allows some individuals to baffle the natural 
tendencies of all the rest." (de Tocqueville 2009, 942), which is exactly what is done here, by 
utilizing this loophole he provides through the use of the word unless, since it is the inequality 
(of conditions) that is seen as the general cause for the occurrence of conflict in societies. 
Though in the view of this theoretical evaluation it is inequalities of both opportunities and 
resources which takes the central position in this mechanism. 
 
This concludes the ideas found in the writings of Alexis de Tocqueville, and the attention will 
now turn to look at some aspects relating to Marxism when dealing with and developing a 
better understanding of the IC-nexus. 
 
Part III: Marxism 
 
As mentioned earlier, Marxism is one of the theories related to the understanding of the IC- 
nexus, where one central mechanism in this theory is that economic inequality is assumed to 
foster a violent potential (Østby 2013, 208). This is the same assumption which is promoted 
in this thesis, related to the IC-nexus, but with some divergences, mainly, as shown through 
the division of inequality, that economic inequality, i.e. the inequality side closest to the 
resource dimension, is not enough to explain levels of violent conflict, and in addition the 
focus on violence is also considered too narrow. This does not mean that economical 
inequalities in themselves cannot create a violent potential, but it is here expected to not be 
enough to isolate this effect in the IC-nexus, because, the claim in this thesis at least is that, 
that can disturb the understanding of other inequalities creating the same effect. And any 
correlation between economical inequality and violent potential would be harder to identify 
by this omission. In addition, the understanding of conflict as violent conflict, is also here 
seen as too narrow in the same manner as inequality, since conflict has to be divided in two 
dimensions, which is violent and non-violent conflict. 
 
When including Marxism as a theory here, it is necessary to mentioned that this Marxist 
theory, or Marxism has had some fluctuations in its influence and standings, both inside 
academia but also in contact with real politics. It is nevertheless here considered pertinent to 
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include this theory, if only based on its influence, since it has been a present force both in 
academia and in politics throughout the last hundred years (Carver 2015, 643). Though, when 
evaluating the elements of Marxism, it is relevant to also include the theme which was 
pointed out in the chapter of political theory and the changing division of political theory and 
altering methodologies, that Marxism came into being in a milieu where the scientific 
domination with an empirical approach had not yet been established since it accrued in the 
early twentieth century and became the dominating approach for social sciences (Carver 2015, 
643). This could mean that it would be meaningful to evaluate this theory with an 
understanding, or at least with an acknowledgement that the theory has its origin in a 
environment of another methodological paradigm than the one which is now currently 
dominating. Or maybe more accurate, has dominated the greater parts of the twentieth 
century, and also has been dominating in the beginning of the twenty-first century. With this 
in mind, the view on Marxism can proceed, though it will get a reduced presentation in 
comparison with its influence, as with some other theories which are included in this thesis, 
on the basis that they on certain aspects seems to narrow to the approach to the IC-nexus 
which is supported in this thesis, but at the same time includes elements which can buttress 
the outline of the general framework for the IC-nexus which will be presented in the latter 
chapters of this thesis. 
 
The Marxist theories of class struggle may have drifted into harsh empirical waters that seems 
to have taken the buoyancy out of the theory as it originally was devised, and though the 
theory as a whole seems shipwrecked, it may be possible to salvage some of its goods. It is 
not hard to understand that with the collapse of the communist regimes at the end of the cold 
war that an expectation of Marxism would be disappearing in the whirlpool that the sunken 
regimes created, though it took an unexpected trajectory, and appeared rather like an phoenix 
from the ashes, at least on a theoretic level in the West (Kymlicka 2002, 167). 
 
On a more concrete level of the ideas from Marxism which can be seen in the relation to the 
IC-nexus, is the idea of that technological progression and the capitalistic economy will foster 
a situation of more and more concentration of the means of production, and a ever larger set 
of workers, or the proletariat as some like to call it, will have to live on a minimum of 
existence, and the economy will be rammed by more and more serious crises (Østberg in 
Marx 2000, xxxi-xxxii). This situation should theoretically be substituted through a revolution 
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that would engulf the whole of humanity (Østberg in Marx 2000, xxxii-xxxiii), though that 
part of the theory haven't seemed yet to materialize, at least not on a global scale. 
 
One of the essential thoughts of the Marxist view, is that all history about society is the 
history of class-struggle of oppressor and oppressors, and this class-struggle is either ended by 
collapse of both of the of the fighting classes, or a revolution of society (Marx 2000, 224). 
Marx writes that the modern bourgeoisie is itself a product of a long line of disruption in the 
ways of production, but also in condition of communication (Marx 2000, 225). But this is 
also, according to Marx, the only way in which the bourgeoisie can survive, by continually 
alter the ways of production and in that way have ever changing societies with the constant 
uncertainty that follows (Marx 2000, 226). By describing some of the mechanisms 
recognizable to Marxist theory, in the writings of the Communist Manifesto, it is not so 
anachronistic to that one cannot identify a contemporary relevance: 
 
 The bourgeoisie has through its exploitation of the world market given a cosmopolitan 
 character to production and consumption in every country. (...). All old-established national 
 industries have been destroyed or are daily being destroyed. (...) The bourgeoisie, by the rapid 
 improvement of all instruments of production, by the immensely facilitated means of 
 communication, draws all nations, (...), into civilization. The cheap prices of its commodities 
 are the heavy artillery with which it batters down all Chinese walls, (...). It compels all nations, 
 on pain of extinction, to adopt the bourgeoisie mode of production; (...), to become 
 bourgeois themselves. In a word, it creates a world after its own image (Marx and Engels 
 1989, 421). 
 
Reading this today, feels more like reading a fulfilled prophecy than a nineteenth century 
political manifestation. Even so, more directly related to the IC-nexus is that this situation will 
foster a concentration of the means of production, concentration of property, and from this a 
concentration of the political system (Marx 2000, 228), which can be translated into 
inequality, at least in the resource dimension. The overproduction that this system brings 
about is a serial of crises that eventually is a situation that the bourgeoisie cannot handle, and 
the same forces that destroyed the feudal society because it couldn't cope with too much 
progression, will now again turn on its current master (Marx 2000, 229). This will be done by 
the side effect of this structure of society, where the worker will be multiplied as a product on 
a market, and where an inherent mechanism of this development is that the more obnoxious 
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the work is, the lower the pay (Marx 2000, 230). In addition, the product of the workers 
through its manifestation in capital can in principle be much the same as the social product 
mention before. It is just that under this societal organization which mainly consist of 
capitalist and worker, the capital can be seen as having a character connected to the capitalist,  
but this understanding is theoretically subjected to alterations and the capital can be seen more 
as a common good and lose its class related disposition (Marx 2000, 237). 
Though even if there exist some proclamations in Marxism that rings true today, there are also 
some elements that hinders it as a complete theory in its primary form. One of these elements 
is that Marxism is:"(...) preoccupied with labour." (Kymlicka 2002, 199). And a development 
which have distanced itself from the former approach of Marxism with this preoccupation 
with labour is that, at least from a perspective of justice, as is shown has been the major 
approach in political theory, or rather normative political theory, that there exist other groups 
in society which struggle for emancipation from their restrictions in society based on other 
classifications such as for example race, gender, immigration and age (Kymlicka 2002, 200). 
In the context of concepts used with the IC-nexus, it could be considered that in Marxism 
there exist a preoccupation on one horizontal, or rather two horizontal divisions in society, in 
the battle of capitalist versus the proletariat. This division is based on an understanding of a 
development of increased polarization between the groups (Kymlicka 2002, 200). And from 
this, there exist two divisions central to the antagonising stance between the two original 
opposed groups based on Marxist theory, i.e. capitalist and worker, at least in the view of 
normative political theory of what constitute justice. One is based on exploitation of the 
worker by the capitalist (Kymlicka 2002, 177), and the other, which may be argued is closely 
connected, is that: "(...) workers are entitled to the product of their labour, (...)." (Kymlicka 
2002, 185). How this is connected to the IC-nexus is that if the workers themselves finds that 
they are entitled to the product of their labour, it could be argued that this provides reason for 
the activation of the FAR and the ECR, that is the frustration-aggressive relation to the person 
assumed responsible for a case of the expectation-capabilities relation deviation. Anyway, it is 
the exploitation which is more directly linked to the IC-nexus, because it can be seen that 
exploitation is just one of many forms of inequality (Kymlicka 2002, 184). By seeing this 
understanding of exploitation up against inequality provided in this thesis, is that exploitation 
can be found, on a theoretic level, together with all forms of inequality either more invested in 
one side of its dimensions of resources or in the other side of opportunities, or more likely in 




When it comes to equality, the angle that Marx puts on equality, or equal rights, is that he 
dismisses it because it's mainly an ideal that is not achievable (Kymlicka 2002, 169-170). This 
understanding of equality is compatible with the idea of the idea of equality in this thesis, 
since it is here seen as equality is not compatible with society. The part of conflict in Marxist 
theory also resonates with the idea of social hierarchy and meaning, since the Marxist theory 
also acknowledge the difference in human nature, which creates different goals. This creates 
the conflicts that in them self may not be valued, but they are a necessary product of a 
meaningful life (Kymlicka 2002, 172). It seems that there is some consistency in this need for 
some kind of interest divergence in human societies to give value to existence in itself, and 
conflict is an unavoidable waste product of the process of living in a society. This is also 
incorporated into the new understanding of Marxist theory, where among others scarcity and 
conflict are permanent features of human society (Kymlicka 2002, 175). 
 
Marxism is based on the thought that material inequality is the most significant of all power 
imbalances in society (Hayward 2015, 589). This is evident in the proletarian vs. capitalist 
conflict, but where Marxism takes its own trajectory in comparison with other conflict 
theories, is where it predicts a elimination of conflict through a more equal distribution of the 
resources when the source of conflict (i.e. capital control over the resources) is eliminated 
(Hayward 2015, 589). This all together is two central elements that for the purpose of this 
thesis eliminates Marxism as a complete theory that can sustain a viable explanation of the 
IC-nexus. This is mainly the unsustainable focus on workers and capitalist as the two main 
duelists of society, and to a certain extent the only duelists, because the evolution of the 
societies have dispersed the strata of societies into other components, so though even if the 
capitalist still composes a distinctive class which maybe has transformed into a more 
commercial class, the working class is not the only opponent to the elite, or not even the main 
opponent, at least when looking at western societies. Though since the capitalist or 
commercial class has globalized, if the analysis of society follow suit, and the distinctions of 
national border is left behind, and the workers are seen in a global perspective as well, the 
working class may be of a greater extent than if one just look out for the worker where the 
products of the worker are consumed. 
 
The second objection from my part that eliminates Marxism as a functional theory for my 
concern of studying the IC-nexus, is that it solely focus on material inequality, and as is 
already highlighted, there is an additional inequality which is the inequality of opportunities 
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that needs to be resolved that must be distinct from any material inequality, even though if 
opportunities and resources have some correlative traits. 
 
Even though Marxism has had some predictions, many which are still relevant today, what 
may be the reef that made Marxism taking in too much water is the manifestation of Marxist 
societies, at least the Marxist societies of the twentieth century, that often distanced 
themselves in a evident way far from the utopian society that theoretically should emerge. 
This future societies that the proletariat theoretically would create was through revolutions 
into a classless society (Gurr 1973, 360), though it can be mentioned in this context that Marx 
himself was critical to some ideas of utopian socialist societies (Kymlicka 2002, 195). This 
doesn't mean that everything that Marxist proclaim to be true is false, but their remedy to the 
challenges of the society dominated by capital may not be the best. And the famous 
proclamation of Marx that through the revolution the proletariat had nothing to lose but its 
chains (Marx 2000, 255), seems to be incorrect if one consider some of the societies which 
have been based on Marxism. Often they could lose their life, and if they survived they were 
still shackled, it was just someone else holding the leash. 
 
Though even if Marxism have had some expectations which seems to have materialized, some 
expectations have not been equally prophetical, for example in that the bourgeoisie generate 
its own demise because of that: "(...) the bourgeoisie, (...), produces above all (...) its own 
grave-diggers. Its fall and the victory of the proletariat are equally inevitable." (Marx and 
Engels 1989, 425), which remove some of the prophetic impression it gives on other 
occasions. 
 
All in all, this gives the Marxist theory some components which are close to the IC-nexus 
mechanism promoted in this thesis, but the narrowness of some aspects in the theory makes it 
unsuitable to model a complete understanding of the IC-nexus. It is especially one feature 
which is seen incompatible for the understanding of the IC-nexus in this thesis, and that is the 
relation to absolute availability of resources instead of relative inequality. Marx is concerned 
with abundance, and sees that scarcity as the reason for conflict (Kymlicka 2002, 172), but the 
approach in this thesis is that the relativity of inequality is more significant for the possibility 
of conflict. In the way that if a society lives in a situation of scarcity, this doesn't necessarily 
lead to conflict, but if the same society with the same type of scarcity distribute the social 
product in a way where a smaller group of that society could live with major parts of the 
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distribution of the already scarce resources (and opportunities), while a larger part of society 
had to be content with the lesser part of the already scarce foundation, that is here considered 
to generate a greater potential for conflict. 
 
Anyway, some of the aspects of Marxism has now been presented which have included 
enough aspects which can be relevant to have available for theorizing about the IC-nexus, 
either as a backdrop or included in the outline of the general framework of the IC-nexus if it is 
found necessary or profitable to include at a later point. This leads me to leave Marxism on 
this occasion, and turn over to the next part of the theoretic foundation, which is based in 
theory of ethnic conflict. 
 
Part IV: Ethnic conflict 
 
Since theory on ethnic conflict figures in the research of the IC- nexus (Østby 2013, 208), it is 
considered reasonable to include a mention of it in combination with the other theoretic 
directions which have been utilized while investigating the nexus. Though it will get a short 
presentation, since it is here considered that ethnic social cleavages and its connection to 
conflict is only indirectly related to ethnicity in that way that it is just one of many 
possibilities of horizontal divisions that can be found in a society. This means, based on the 
theoretic view in this thesis, that if there exist conflict in a society, and these conflicts are tied 
with ethnic divisions in that society, this is because the inequalities of that society is related to 
ethnicity as well. Thus, it is not ethnicity that causes conflict, but the underlying inequalities 
which is tied up to this particular social horizontal division. What causes ethnicity to be an 
active horizontal social division in a society is beyond this thesis to measure, more than 
providing an assumption that it can be found in a combination of historical trajectories, 
technological advancement and based in social, economical and political decisions, both 
inside the society where ethnicity is a major component, but also from outside. It will here 
nevertheless briefly be mentioned here since it is a part of the IC-nexus research. 
 
Some of the developments in modern history including the time of major decolonization of 
the 1960s, have laid barren two major sources of conflict, which are class, as shown above is 
a major divide in Marxism, but also in addition ethnicity, which is influenced by colonial 




Crawford Young writes that there exist some distinctions between the concepts of class and 
ethnicity, but also some common ones, and he specifies one of on their commonalities: "Like 
ethnicity, class is, both objectively and subjectively, a relational concept." (Young 1982, 73). 
This coincide with the theoretic understanding of ethnicity in this thesis, where the two 
horizontal categories of class and ethnicity constitute two possible social cleavages. A 
difference between the concepts of class and ethnicity is that class is foremost an analytical 
construct, and in the case of Africa, as relevant in a colonial context, the existing forms of 
inequality did not fit the standard class terminology, where other forms of inequality laid the 
ground for different understanding for the existing horizontal cleavages (Young 1982, 73). 
There exist some divergence between what is the most salient features of either class or 
ethnicity, and they can take on a different role in a societal organizing and administration, but 
the underlying theoretic assumption which is prominent in this thesis is that it is foremost an 
organizational unit in some combination with others horizontal influences of society, like 
language, religion and regional affiliation, beside class and ethnicity which provides some 
common horizontal features (Young 1982, 73). 
 
There is also a division of the state that is relevant to include when discussing ethnic conflict, 
or rather why ethnicity can be a salient horizontal cleavage, or that any actual horizontal 
cleavage can be a salient horizontal cleavage, which is that the state can be understood as: 
"(...) existing on two levels: concrete and theoretical." (Young 1982, 72). The concrete part of 
the state is easier to identify than the theoretical aspect of the state, where the theoretical 
aspect consist of the ideology which is persistent in the state, which can influence the more 
evolutional aspects of the state of which values and code of conduct that are acceptable 
(Young 1982, 72-73). It would be admissible to presume that the ideology in a society will 
influence the concrete development of a society, and also that the ideology of a society is 
changeable, either by force or by natural development. Though societal changes through force 
may in itself be seen as a form of natural development. From this, it is clear that salient 
horizontal changes in society is also subject to shifting circumstances, with in combination 
with both the ideological and the concrete features of the state creates a dynamic where the 
different elements both influences and are influenced by each other, but the major point is that 
they are changing. This is also compatible with the wide consensus found in studies on ethnic 
conflict that the salience of ethnicity in a society is subject to temporal changes (Caselli and 




To summarize, the understating of ethnic conflict in this thesis, which here also includes some 
thoughts of the dimensions of class, as they are seen as two different horizontal cleavages in 
this thesis, is that ethnicity, and class, have been two major ways in distinction how conflict 
can emerge in a society, and this is only because this is how the society is arranged and thus 
which collective boundaries that are contagious of conflict. The type of distinction is not here 
in itself seen as the cause conflict, the cause is as it is claimed in this thesis, an underlying 
(excessive) inequality in whatever category one would like to divide a society into. If it is 
class, the inequality beyond a point would lead to increased conflict, if its ethnicity, the same 
effect would emerge, though in another framework of central societal collective identities. So 
whatever collective social prevalent identities that is currently occupying the larger social 
dynamic, is here just seen as the coulisse for the natural human competition for resources and 
opportunities, which will emerge in all societies, though under different guises, and in a 
modern context, based on the division of the state in a concrete and theoretical dimension.  
 
One essential underlying dynamics for these collective identities are the understanding of we 
versus others, or self versus others, which is the underlying mechanism which maintains the 
existing  horizontal cleavages, which both contains objective and subjective elements for the 
actors in the relevant categories (Young 1982, 73-74), but since the goal for this thesis is not 
to search for the root of conflict based on a specific categorization of the potential collective 
divisions of a society, there is no reason to extrapolate on this issue more than mention it as a 
final contextual support for the understanding of ethnical conflict, and its relation to other 
horizontal cleavages, and how ethnicity and other horizontal social dimensions relate to the 
IC-nexus based on the theoretic understanding of this mechanism in this thesis. 
 
Ethnicity is clearly related to conflict, both historically and contemporary as is seen in many 
instances of its appearances in the news, but it is not here seen as automatically a cause of 
conflict, since there exist several societies where diverse ethnical groups coexist in peaceful 
societal relations (Caselli and Coleman II 2013, 162). There may be reasons that makes 
ethnicity a salient issue in a society, which may be more or less easy to identify to other 
dimensions of society, like political and economical areas. Though the main understanding in 
this thesis is that it is a continued changing element of society, and how it occupies the social 
consciousness. Francesco Caselli and Wilbur John Coleman II writes that: "(...) policy that 
blurs sharp distinctions between groups will reduce the incidence of ethnic conflict." (Caselli 
and Coleman II 2013, 189). I want to extrapolate from this statement the opposite as well, that 
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policy that highlight distinctions between groups will increase the incidence of ethnic conflict. 
And not just ethnic conflict, but whatever distinction that is highlighted in society, both 
through its concrete and ideological dimensions, which will influence which dimension that 
becomes salient. From this is also where the dimensions from where the inequalities in society 
arise, based on whatever composition of society which is prevalent. At least that is how this 
mechanism is understood on a theoretic level in this thesis in the combination with the IC-
nexus, and if the conflict which arise from the IC-nexus is an ethnic conflict, is mainly 
because ethnic horizontal elements of that society is a salient societal issue, which manifest 
itself through inequalities based on this societal fragmentation. 
 
This will end the discussion of ethnic conflict in the relation to the IC-nexus on this occasion, 
and the attention will turn over to the theory which focuses on structural causes for conflict. 
 
Part V: Structural theory 
 
Structural theory has several aspects but for this thesis it will be focused on structural theory 
which is most connected to the conflict side of the IC-nexus. This is because it is considered 
here that to include elements of structural theory on this dimension of the IC-nexus can 
contribute to make the final outline of the general framework for the IC-nexus more complete 
in strengthening the understanding of the division of conflict into a violent and a non-violent 
dimension. The conflict dimension, as with the inequality dimension of the IC-nexus, present 
both challenges when climbing down the ladder of abstraction, and it is here considered that 
some aspects of structural theory can provide more concrete concepts of the conflict side of 
the IC-nexus by providing insight into the more hidden forms of conflict in society, where 
violence may be the more apparent type of conflict in a society. Johan Galtung writes when it 
comes to the concept of violence that:  
 
 (...) there are obviously many types of violence. More important is to indicate theoretically 
 significant dimensions of violence that can lead thinking, research and, potentially, action, 
 towards the most important problems. (...) the concept of violence must be broad enough to 
 include the most significant varieties, yet specific enough to serve as a basis for concrete 




The central understanding of the difference between violent and non-violent conflict in this 
thesis is that the violence consist of a form of conflict which ends with some form of direct 
physical harm, foremost to human beings. The non-violent part of this understanding consists 
of conflicts which takes resources out of the society to handle conflict which not necessarily 
leads to physical harm, but may certainly create psychological harm. Of course this division 
of violence can be seen in many different ways, as with Galtung which divides violence into 
both physical and psychological (Galtung 1969, 169), which diverges a bit from what will be 
proposed in this thesis, but as he also include is that to define violence: "(...) is a highly 
unenviable task, (...)." (Galtung 1969, 168). It is not here either a goal to provide an 
exhaustive understanding of violence, non-violence, or structural violence which will soon be 
returned to how can be understood as it is an essential this part of structural theory, but the 
objective here is to discuss the issue of the conflict side of the IC-nexus to provide a 
foundation for evaluation of how the conflict side of the IC-nexus can be understood, which 
again will influence empirical investigations of the nexus. By increasing the sophistication of 
the concepts of the conflict side of the nexus, it is here believed that the diverging results from 
the empirical test may show some more consensus in their findings, even if those findings 
points in another direction than the one supported in this thesis. 
 
But to understand the structural part of structural theory, it is possible to look at a description 
of how structural violence can be understood, where: 
 
 Structural violence refers to a form of violence wherein social structures or social institutions 
 harm people by preventing them from meeting their basic needs. (...). The harm is structural  
 because it is a product of the way we have organized our social world; it is violent because it 
 causes injury and death. (...) Structural violence directly illustrates a power system wherein 
 social structures or institutions cause harm to people in a way that results in maldevelopment 
 or deprivation (Lee 2016, 109-110). 
 
Even if one sees violence consisting of both a psychological and a physiological dimension or 
not, it is the structure which creates this violence that is of interest. This can partly be seen up 
against the division of the state mentioned in the chapter above, with the concrete and 
ideological dimensions, where the structure and the concrete aspects of the state, or of a 
society, is reasonable to considered to be closely connected. In relation to structural violence, 
Galtung specify this division that there are two types of violence, where if there is an actor 
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involved, it will be understood as direct or personal, but if there is an absences of such a 
visible direct actor, but the outcome is violent anyway, the violence is considered structural 
or indirect. And these differences are related to the identification of the cause for violence, 
since the direct type of violence is easier to identify than the indirect since it is invested in the 
structure of society and can show itself more as instances of structural inequalities (Galtung 
1969, 170-171). 
 
From this, what is essential in relation of the IC-nexus, and the understanding and testing of it 
is that the structure of which actors exist influence their actions, and a too simple inclusion of 
violence or conflict may give imprecise results, both in theoretic evaluations and in empirical 
tests. It would be strange to evaluate an actor's actions without including the context which 
the individual exist in (Galtung 1964, 96), that is that the society in which men live in must be 
included in an evaluation of their actions. For the IC-nexus, to understand the nexus 
thoroughly, the combination of the structure and the actors inside it, are the two components 
that produce the outcome, which also must be included when predicting or testing an outcome 
of the nexus. 
 
The aspects of structural theory will not be pursued much more than including this division of 
actor and structure, since the outline of the general framework for the IC-nexus in this thesis 
mainly lies at a higher level of abstraction, but there are some elements that can be relevant to 
include before continuing to the last theoretic approach, and that is that the structures of a 
society have some general tendencies. And that is that these structures are subject to the 
universal phenomena of stratification, which implies that these social structures are hierarchal, 
stable and divides the burden of labour, where the distances in a social system created by this 
stratification can be reduced, but they cannot be eliminated (Galtung 1964, 96). This 
culminates in a situation where some factors in a structure becomes more valuable than 
others, though they can differ from structure to structure, and that will eventually lead to a 
division between haves and haves not, which Galtung refers to as the topdog and underdog 
position (Galtung 1964, 96). This distinction of the structural part of society can be related to 
the understanding in this thesis of that society and inequality is on a level synonyms in that 
without inequality there is no society, though the type and degree of inequality can differ both 
in a temporal and a spatial manner. But since a central part of a society is the division of 
labour, which again is central to be able to gain a larger social product, these divisions also 
sink into the structure and influence the society which in it resides and create stratifications. 
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These stratifications can be related to the horizontal divisions mentioned earlier. Though the 
mechanism of the IC-nexus supported here is the simple positive one is consistent with this 
relation between actor and structure and society and inequality, since: "Where there is 
stratification, there will also be exploitation." (Galtung 1964, 97). And as shown in the 
chapter about Marxism, exploitation is in this thesis considered a form of conflict, the 
mechanism is then that humans creates societies which leads to stratification, which is a form 
of inequality, which creates conflict. Though, since it is mainly the structural element of 
structural theory which is considered to be the essential component to include in the further 
evaluation of the IC-nexus, the attention will now turn to the final part of this theoretic 
foundation of the theoretic overview, which is a more specific and complete theory that 
focuses on the relative aspect of human relations. This is an aspect which Galtung also 
mentions when he discusses the different compositions and positional relations of societal 
elements, of the haves and the have not's, i.e. the different compositions of topdog and 
underdog, where he asks: "What matters most, absolute or relative position?" (Galtung 1964, 
102). This may be a confounding element when studying the IC-nexus, because when 
inequality is to be examined, should one focus of the relative or the absolute inequality in a 
society? This question is a central element of the final theory of this theoretic foundation, and 
this question is also related to the two different actors included in the former chapters between 
the division of the rational and the deprived actor, where the rational actor is closely 
connected to the absolute and the deprived actor to the relative. This is where the attention 
now turns with a view of the relative deprivation theory. 
 
Part VI: The relative deprivation theory 
 
The relative deprivation theory (RDT) has been developed by several researchers, though the 
concept of relative deprivation (RD) is a concept from Samuel Stouffer (Pettigrew 2015, 7), 
which he based in a logic that: "Satisfaction is relative, (...), to the available comparisons we 
have." (Pettigrew 2015, 11). A more comprehensive explanation of this concept, with a 
clearer inclusion of the deprived part of the concept is that: "If comparisons to other people, 
groups, or even themselves at different points in time lead people to believe that they do not 
have what they deserve, they will be angry and resentful. RD describes these subjective 




The concept of RD will in this thesis be utilized through Ted R. Gurr's relative deprivation 
theory (RDT) where he defines relative deprivation as: "(...) a perceived discrepancy between 
men's value expectations and their value capabilities." (Gurr 1971, 13). I'll soon return to 
specify exactly what value expectations and value capabilities are. Gurr's RDT is a 
continuation of thoughts on a relative deprivation theory found in an article from James C. 
Davies, where Davies contrast elements from de Tocqueville and Marx, and propose a 
mechanism for revolutions where he theorize that: "Revolutions are most likely to occur when 
a prolonged period of objective economic and social development is followed by a short 
period of sharp reversal." (Davies 1962, 6). It may be that it is the objective changes that 
creates the foundation for revolution, but as he continues: "The actual state of socio-economic 
development is less significant than the expectation that past progress, now blocked, can and 
must continue in the future." (Davies 1962, 6). He calls this development the J-curve pattern, 
where there is an increase in expectations which is frustrated by a following decline in 
circumstances which hinders the expectations being realized (Davies 1962, 8). 
 
The relative deprivation theory is a major influence on IC-nexus studies (Østby 2013, 209), 
and in this thesis, the inclusion of the relative deprivation theory in this theoretic foundation 
of this theoretic overview will foremost be based on the Gurr's relative deprivation theory. 
 
Gurr's relative deprivation theory takes its starting point by trying to explain why human 
societies in some instances experience disruption of social order by violence, which is 
political when the source for disruption is focused on the rule of society (Gurr 1971, 7-8), 
where the understanding of this mechanism includes both societal and psychological factors 
(Gurr 1971, 12). The main concept of the RDT, based on Gurrs version of it, is that in his 
theory, and to return to his definition of relative deprivation, is that he sees it as: "(...) actors` 
perception of discrepancy between their value expectations and their value capabilities." (Gurr 
1971, 24), where he continues to specify that the: "Value expectations are the goods and 
conditions of life to which people believe they are rightfully entitled." (Gurr 1971, 24), and 
that: "Value capabilities are the goods and conditions they think they are capable of getting 
and keeping." (Gurr 1971, 24). Though an important addition to this understanding is also that 
the judgment of these values and expectations is not subjected to an absolute standard, but the 
judgement is based on relations to others as a group or to another individual, through the 
assessment of the actor that is, or rather, feels deprived (Gurr 1971, 24). A possible amplifier 
of a deprived situation is that in an actor's evaluation of his position based on his value 
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expectations and value capabilities, is that he should at least have what he already have or be 
better off when contemplating alternative positions to his situation: "Men ordinarily expect to 
keep what they have; they also generally have a set of expectations and demands about what 
they should have in the future, which is usually as much or more than what they have at 
present." (Gurr 1971, 27). 
 
There are many other specifications that Gurr presents in his theory in regard to the different 
components of the RDT, but the presentation here is a more general one, so it will here only 
be highlighted the most essential elements of the theory, and in doing that there is a need for 
including the concepts of intensity and scope. These two components are directly related to 
the RD of the RDT, where intensity is a concept that refer to the distance between value 
expectations and value capabilities, and scope is the amount of individuals that are affected of 
a specific deprivation (Gurr 1971, 29). This can effect what kind of deprivation that appear, 
which can be categorized in three different ways, which are decremental-, aspirational- or 
progressive deprivation, and which Gurr presents on a collective level (Gurr 1971, 46). The 
difference in these three types of deprivation is that the decremental is an idea of permanent 
value expectations with declining value capabilities, the aspirational deprivation is a situation 
where the value capabilities remains stable but the value expectations are increasing, and the 
final one is that there is a situation where both value capabilities and value expectations 
increase simultaneously, but where at one point the value capabilities decrease or stabilize 
without a similar limitation on the value expectation, and all these types of deprivation are 
expected to influence the potential for political violence (Gurr 1971, 46). But they will also be 
subjected to the forces of scope and intensity in how effectual these deprivations will be for 
the possibility for any societal disruptions. The last type of deprivation, i.e. the progressive 
type, is also the same function found in the works of James C. Davies, where it is labelled the 
J-curve (Gurr 1971, 52), as is mentioned above. Though a small note is that there exist some 
limitations to these effects in that they are not expected to be equally strong in every 
circumstance, at least if a situation of deprivation is predictable, where the theory include that 
a possible prediction of the deprivation can in itself subdue the forces of deprivation. But if a 
situation of RD occurs without it being expected, the effects of violent upheaval is likely to 
occur (Gurr 1971, 57-58). 
 
There exist also variables that determines the scope and intensity of deprivation. Salience is 
one of them, and portray how important different values are, either for an individual or for a 
76 
 
collective (Gurr 1971, 66), and opportunities, which is the opportunities that are available for 
actors in their pursuit of their respective valuable goals (Gurr 1971, 73). This last variable, 
which is also important in the theoretic approach in this thesis as one of the dimensions of the 
concept of inequality, is also supported by evidence that reduced opportunities increase 
possibilities of violent action, and vice versa, increased opportunities tempers that response 
(Gurr 1971, 73-74). The variation of salience is also important, but is considered a too elusive  
an issue to evaluate wholly at this stage for the goal of contributing to make an outline of a 
general framework for the IC-nexus, since salience is expected to be related to a plethora of 
cultural variations which is beyond the scope of this thesis to evaluate. It is here considered 
mostly more suitable as an issue for empirical investigation, by detecting what constitute 
salience of values in different societies. 
 
Since this thesis is centred in political theory, it is pertinent to include themes that points in 
that direction on occasions, even though the political element can at sometimes be hard to 
detect in this thesis. Gurr writes that: "(...), potential for collective violence is a function of the 
extent and intensity of shared discontent among members of a society; (...)."(Gurr 1971, 8). 
And as pointed out above, when collective violence is directed at the rule of society, which it 
in theory is when the source of the discontent is by the deprived actors believed to be found in 
the administration of a society through whatever regime that may reside in that position. And 
as also mentioned above, scope is the amount of peoples that feel deprived, which can quickly 
become political if they simultaneously sees the rule of society as the source of their 
deprivation. 
 
For the sake of this thesis, it is necessary to make some reformulation of this proposition to 
synchronize it with the concepts used in this thesis, this is since for this thesis, the primary 
interested is not in collective violence, but the more general, or more abstract concept of 
conflict. This is done by the use of the method of reconstruction, mentioned in the chapter for 
political theory methods, where the original statement, provided in the citation above, is 
below adapted to work within the conceptual framework of this thesis. This means that parts 
of the proposition is slightly reformulated to remove the focus that only apply to the collective 
and violent perspective in this proposition, and by reformulating, or reconstructing it, the 
altered proposition that is supported in this thesis is that the potential for conflict is a function 
of extent and intensity of discontent among members of society, and to connect this to the 
inequality side in the IC-nexus, it is supposed for this thesis, that inequality in a society is the 
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cause for this potential conflict by influencing the grade of discontent between the members 
of a society. The reason for making this alteration is because what makes a conflict collective 
or individual is not an evaluation which is done in this study. Whatever be the exact major, or 
maybe minor, causes that turns a conflict into collective or individual action is also beyond 
the scope of this study to include, since it is here tried to keep the issues of this study on the 
more general levels of the IC-nexus, both based on scope of this thesis, and to try to keep a 
higher level of clarity in the evaluation of the nexus. The violence part of collective violence 
is also amended to conflict, in compliance with the rest of the setup for this thesis.  
This  taken together, what's actually is reconstructed from the original citation provided 
above, is just that the specification of collective in collective violence is taken out, and 
violence is amended to conflict. The reason for doing this is to make the concepts comply 
with the outline of the general framework for the IC-nexus which is tried created here, and 
with only using conflict, the proposition can include both violent and non-violent forms of 
conflict, both in an individual and a collective way. This distances the theory a bit away from 
political conflict, which is a central issue here, as it is political theory which is utilized. But as 
shown above, the political factor is relevant when the rule of society is to blame for the 
deprivation of the relevant deprived actors, or rather gets the blame from the relevant deprived 
actors. But it is in this thesis assumed that by zooming too close up to political conflict, at 
least all the way in to political violence, one misses aspects that influence these instances of 
conflict, and a more general framework will offer greater understanding of the more concrete 
occurrences of examples of political violence. This is based on that it is here assumed that 
political violence is a post-inequality phenomena, where there are many factors that can turn 
any aggression towards political disruption, which may be the potential for collective or 
individual action, like recourses, communication, leaders, common goals etc., and the main 
foundations of the outline of the general framework for the IC-nexus tried developed here is 
that inequality may foster political violence, but if the channels for political violence aren't 
available or is not seen as an available option for redressing grievances, it just will show its 
consequence as social instances of conflict, both individual and collective and violent and-non 
violent. 
 
An additional note to these amendments, it can be mentioned since it is here taken some of the 
propositions out of the RDT and changed for the need of compliance with the concepts used 
in this thesis that Gurr encourages amendments of his understanding of the RDT as it can 
increase knowledge on the issue. Gurr writes in relation to his development of the RDT that: 
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"The concepts, hypotheses, and models of causes and processes developed in the following 
chapters are not intended as ends in themselves. (...). Systematic knowledge requires us to 
propose and test and reformulate and retest statements about how and why things happen." 
(Gurr 1971, 15). As is done her to amend the propositions into the framework of this thesis. 
 
To include some individual elements of the RDT, it is pertinent to specify that Gurr also 
includes that there are individual differences in how individuals perceive deprivation (Gurr 
1971, 9), and I want to extend that understanding with an inclusion that it is also individual 
differences in how conflicts are resolved, which for this thesis is divided into the two now 
hopefully soon familiar dimensions of violent and non-violent means for conflict. This 
understanding is such that if a person is in a condition of deprivation to the level where he 
takes actions to relieve his deprivation, this level of deprivation that facilitates action against 
it will vary based on each individual. In addition, the same will be assumed to happen 
between individuals that reach this limit, in how they confront the problem at hand, i.e. with 
violent or non-violent means. 
 
The amendments of the concepts done here is to be able to provide the basis for the outline of 
a general framework for the IC-nexus. And there are some restrictions which must be 
considered when doing this. These amendments can maybe be considered as an instance of 
conceptual stretching caught in the act, or maybe it is only plain conceptual substitution, but 
the important element to consider when adjusting concepts, as also mentioned before, is that 
that there has to exist universals which lay the foundation of other concepts that can be 
subjected to empirical scrutiny (Sartori 1970, 1035). These are regulations that are considered 
to be upheld with the amendments done to the concepts here. It is considered here that both 
inequality and conflict are concepts that can be submitted to empirical inspection without 
presenting insurmountable obstacles, especially when they both already, during this thesis, 
has been subjected to a dichotomous division that removes some of their abstractness. Gurr 
does also include the challenge of a theory and its need for subjugation to empiric results. He 
applies four concrete factors between theoretic assumptions and empirical evidence that needs 
to be achieved to strengthen a theory which are: "(...) falsifiability, definitional clarity, 
identification of relevant variables at various levels of analysis, and applicability to a large 
universe of events for analysis." (Gurr 1971, 17). All this is here considered achievable with 
the modified elements of the theory, and especially is the objective of definitional clarity an 
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goal that is tried achieved here through the presentation of the alternative concepts promoted 
and supported in this thesis. 
 
The elements that Gurr bases his RDT on is that it is psychological and societal variables that 
leads to political violence, and that it is the relative deprivation that leads men to assess 
whether they achieve their expectations or not (Gurr 1971, 12-13). Gurr writes that it is also 
this discrepancy between the two positions that leads to the increased probability of political 
violence (i.e. for this thesis conflict), and addition to this the aim for eventual action on this 
discrepancy is: "(...) determined by men's beliefs about the sources of deprivation, and about 
the normative and utilitarian justifiability of violent action directed at the agents responsible 
for it." (Gurr 1971, 13). This citations opens up a Pandora's box of possibilities for concrete 
actions a deprived actor will take. This is also the reason for that in this thesis it is promoted 
that the concepts used of the IC-nexus should not be subjected to reduced abstractness without 
having its origin in the overreaching concepts of inequality and conflict, since who knows 
what men believe are the sources of their frustration, especially when it is confused by a 
combination with the set of values they have as a foundation for their evaluations. And the 
reason for this thesis in not isolating the focus on politics is that if this mixture of frustrating 
variables don't emerge as political conflict, it is hard to imagine that the deprivation in itself is 
relieved. It is more likely that it increases, as the deprivation can be assumed not to be 
relieved, and if the actual responsible agents for the deprivation are not available, it is not 
impossible to imagine that a substitute created responsible agent can take its place as a 
suitable prygelknabe. There is no obvious reason that the believed responsible agent has to be 
the actual responsible agent, it can just as well be the created agent. An additional amplifier of 
this function is also, as Gurr writes, that in the modern world the discontent are more 
politicized than the being political, because of the: "(...) ambiguity of origin of many 
deprivations in increasingly complex societies, (...)." (Gurr 1971, 179). And in juxtaposing 
this notion against the development of complex societies and manifestations of new societal 
values and the increase in communicative capabilities, at least the last thirty years with the 
increased use and reach of the internet, it is hardly a controversial statement to claim that the 
complexity of the global societies are increasing, and to indentify an actual agent of a cause of 
deprivation is a daunting task, and maybe it is easier to give that role to someone which is 
available to be addressed, either through violent or non-violent types of conflicts. In addition, 
the introduction to the relatives which one identifies oneself with, may also take on new forms 
if one finds oneself at the lower level of a societal hierarchy, but for example compares 
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oneself with the televised upper parts of the same society, the intensity of the deprivation can 
quickly become immense as: "Exposure to more attractive modes of life and the consequent 
intensification of value expectations is facilitated by system-wide communication networks 
(...)." (Gurr 1971, 223), which can hardly be said to be decreasing. 
 
A final inclusion of this logic of making the RDT political relevant at the end of this 
presentation and discussion of the RDT, supported both by psychological and group conflict 
theory, is also that the greater the intensity of the supposed deprivation, the greater is the 
potential for violence (Gurr 1971, 13). But I find it relevant to include one minor but possible 
influential element which I find not always is addressed in a satisfactory manner, and that is 
that:"A common proposition in theoretical writing on political violence is that its magnitude 
varies inversely with the coercive capabilities of a regime." (Gurr 1971, 233). It is not that it 
varies inversely which is reacted to here, but that the coercive capabilities of a regime here 
seems to not be categorized or recognized as political violence. As it is only the oppositional 
forces to the regime which are political. Since it in this thesis is considered that the 
understanding of conflict should be regarded as both violent and non-violent, it is understood 
that some of the coercive forces of a regime are non-violent, but it also includes violent 
approaches, as for example the some obvious instances as capital punishment and torture. It is 
at least in this thesis found unsatisfactory to not include the coercive forces of the sitting 
regime as political, especially if one were to test the level of political conflict empirically. 
This may be particularly relevant with the point specified before that stability can be confused 
with force, and that may dictate the results of empirical investigations, if some understand 
stability only as the absence of violence and continued constant social routines. And as shown 
in the next chapter when looking on some empirical tests of the IC-nexus, where some of 
them evaluate stability, or use the concept of stability, it is found here that to include the 
regimental source of conflict in an evaluation of levels of conflict is essential, and not 
including the force needed to keep a society stable as the same as the absence of conflict. 
 
Though in total, the RDT provides some helpful assumptions in the understanding of the 
minds of men and how they react to unwelcomed situations, even if de Tocqueville has a 
comment for those who dear to try to disclose those effects as well, especially when 
inequality is considered, here exemplified through equality: "But men will never establish any 
equality with which they can be contended. (...), the inequality of minds would still remain, 
which, (...), will forever escape the laws of man." (de Tocqueville 2009, 1029). This makes it 
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hard to test the functions of the actor in his societal relations through the limitations of laws, 
be they legal or scientific. But at least this understanding support the notion of that society 
must include inequalities, as is also supported by Gurr, that: "Social conflict is ubiquitous and 
inevitable in social life." (Gurr 1971, 301), which all points in the direction which is 




The theoretic overview have been divided into two sections, which consists of a four part 
theoretic framework and a six part theoretic foundation. The four parts of the theoretic 
framework have included support for the school of conflict, (over the school of consensus). 
Then the inclusions of the conflict actors were mentioned through the DA and the RA, i.e. the 
deprived and the rational actor. The division of society in vertical (individual) and horizontal 
(collective) dimensions was investigated and a presentation of some indicators that the ideas 
of the IC-nexus is not of recent origin were included. The six parts theoretic foundation 
consisted first of two aspects of conflict theories were included in the first part, which were 
the FAR and the ECR, i.e. the frustration-aggression relation and the expectation-capabilities 
relation. Then the five theoretical lines were presented. First by introducing Alexis de 
Tocqueville with different elements extracted from his writings with an emphasis on the 
equality of conditions. In Marxism elements of scarcity and resources in an absolute form 
were prominent, with a clear dichotomous horizontal division of society between the 
bourgeois and the proletariat, or the capitalist and the worker, to use terms closer to 
contemporary usage. In ethnic theory the understanding of the divide of the state as concrete 
and ideological dimension was included, though with an specification that ethnicity is just one 
of several ways horizontal divisions in a society that can appear. In structural theory the 
division of direct (personal) and indirect (structural) violence was included, though amended 
to direct and indirect conflict for this thesis. And finally the RDT embraced several elements, 
where the main elements were value capabilities and value expectations, scope and intensity, 
salience and opportunity, where a mixture of these elements can lead to a variation of 
consequences, and where there was emphasised that the relative nature of our societies is 
paramount to its understanding, i.e. to the understanding of our nature, and thus the 




Chapter 6: Empirical research and the IC-nexus 
 
The empirical inclusion in this thesis will focus on the conceptual dimension of the IC-nexus, 
as it has been specified before that the mixtures of concept used when testing the IC-nexus 
has not been unison. The empirical evidence, which here is mainly centred in the quantitative 
empirical work, and that are included in this thesis is not an exhaustive list, but is a selection 
of cases of empirical research which have tried to test the IC-nexus, though under other names 
than calling it the IC-nexus, as it exists a plethora of concepts for these types of 
investigations. This selection of empirical studies which is included here is influenced by the 
choice of centring the thesis in political theory, and means that empirical support which have 
been included in this theoretic evaluation of the IC-nexus, is not as comprehensive as a 
systematic scientific scrutiny of all empirical IC-nexus relate studies. But it is here considered 
that the chosen selection of empirical cases suffice to provide the relevant information needed 
to continue into a discussion of the result from the whole thesis. This statement needs a bit of 
extra specification, since it is related to the methods and methodologies which have been 
utilized in his thesis. As mentioned before, concepts are a central component of political 
theory, and this thesis is based in political theory, and when analysing conceptual evolution, 
or conceptual history, the approach of taking all available empirical text may be ideal but it is 
not practical, but a selection of relevant empirical results must be chosen in an conscious 
manner (Blau 2017, 249), which is done here. In addition there exist a challenge of deciding 
which empirical tests can be defined as an IC-nexus relevant test when the concepts in this 
area of research is diverging, which would most likely lead to differences in evaluating what a 
complete of IC-nexus empirical studies would consist of. And some studies may exclude 
themselves, since as Lichbach indicates, there exist some qualitative divergence in the 
quantitative research on the IC-nexus, where some of the research: "(...) are perhaps best 
forgotten." (Lichbach 1989, 436-437). As the conceptual use and evolution of the IC-nexus is 
a central interest here, it could be added that for the concepts of inequality and conflict, to 
take a complete evaluation of those concepts based on all scientific, theoretic and 
philosophical writings would be beyond anyone, so the pragmatic choice here have been to 
include enough of the empirical evidence to highlight a point about the use of these concepts 
in the IC-investigations. A more scientific scrutiny of the same type of investigation is also 
warranted, but not seen possible or desired to do simultaneously as this theoretic approach. In 
addition, a caveat to the comprehensive approach is that even if all empirical investigations 
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are included in a study, and the evaluation of the result can differ anyway, since: "(...): no 
empirical claims can be known for certain, and the same evidence can always be read 
differently." (Blau 2017, 261). And in an instance of uncertainty, which is clinging on to the 
IC-nexus, the production of facts does not need to be in the centre of every investigation, even 
if the study is based on it. From this, the approach follow here is close to the approach 
recommended by Adrian Blau where he writes: "Do not see yourself as reporting facts, but as 
reporting your confidence in your inferences." (Blau 2017, 262), which is an approach 
followed here. 
 
Though before presenting the chosen empirical evidence, it is reasonable to include evidence 
that the results from the empirical research is leading into several different directions in 
regard to extract a clear function of the IC-nexus. But since there exist a clear understanding 
in the literature that the research of the IC-nexus is providing a mixture of results, it is deemed 
reasonable to include some documentation for this before continuing on to the conceptual 
issues of the IC-nexus research. That is, there exist inconclusiveness when it comes to the 
results of the research of the IC-nexus, and the objective here for this thesis is to highlight the 
collective inconclusiveness in the concepts behind the inconclusive results, where the 
inconclusiveness in the results of the empirical research has been reported by several 
researchers of the IC-nexus (Nagel 1974,1; Weede 1981, 640; Lichbach 1989, 440; Cramer 
2003, 400; Østby 2013, 206; Bartusevicius 2014, 36). 
 
To show some of the effects found in this field of research, it is possible to go back to Mark 
Irving Lichbach's study from 1989 where he identifies five different theoretical assumptions 
of the IC-nexus, though he uses the EI-PC (economic inequality - political violence) division 
rather than the IC-division, and where four of those assumptions have been confirmed to exist 
based on empirical evidence, even though they assume different effects of the IC-nexus. 
Lichbach identifies that from a hypothesis that political conflict is a function of economical 
inequality, that there exist a positive, a negative, a concave (inverted U-shaped) and a non-
effectual relationship of the IC-nexus which all these four effects have been confirmed 
empirically (Lichbach 1989, 436-440). In addition there is a fifth assumption of a convex 
relationship (U-shaped), which had not been tested empirically (Lichbach 1989, 438-439). 
The different shapes of these four empirical tested and partly confirmed effects are presented 










                                               
1 These figures are based on similar figures found in Landman (2008, 140). Some alterations have 
been made of the figures to synchronize it with the theme of this thesis. The main alteration is that a 
figure of a null-effect is included, and a convex figure is excluded, since the goal here is to show 
functions of the IC-nexus that have empirical support, not only the ones that have theoretical support. 
Another alteration which has been made is the use of the concepts of conflict and inequality in the 




Before continuing to investigate some of the empirical studies of the IC-nexus, with a focus 
on the use of concepts in these studies, it can be practical to include some of the remarks that 
Lichbach wrote in his evaluation in his study of the IC-nexus studies. He writes that: 
"Anomalous, inconsistent, and inconclusive findings provide grist for theoretical and 
empirical reformulations of the basic EI-PC idea." (Lichbach 1989, 432), while later 
specifying that: "In sum, the EI-PC puzzle raises the general issue of Inequality-Political 
Conflict (I-PC)." (Lichbach 1989, 433). On this modification from the EI-PC to the I-PC 
nexus, in his conclusion he writes that: "DA theories suggest that economic inequality is not 
the only type of inequality that influences conflict." (Lichbach 1989, 467), and further that: 
"Propositions should (...) not be limited to the EI-PC nexus but rather expanded to the whole 
I-PC question." (Lichbach 1989, 467). These are issues that are incorporated in this thesis, in 
that theoretic reformulations in the concepts used to a more abstract level of inequality, but in 
addition it is considered that the conflict side of the I-PC-nexus should be amended to only 
conflict, and thus Lichbach's suggestion of taking the EI-PC nexus and expand it up to the I-
PC nexus is here taken one step further by expanding it all the way to the IC-nexus. This is 
since as mentioned earlier to focus too early on political conflict, even if political conflict is 
the object of interest, is in this thesis assumed to obscure the understanding of this effect, by 
not acknowledging that conflict from inequality can take other forms than political, and if the 
conflict becomes political is based in a plethora of obscure reasons, which here is argued 
cannot be understood without taking a broader approach to the subject. 
 
To start at the beginning, the empirical study which Russett undertook in 1964 took its 
starting point in inequality and instability. He writes that there exist some conceptual 
challenges where in how to understand the dependent variable (Russett 1964, 443), though his 
hypotheses are intended to test: "(...) the relation between economic inequality and politics." 
(Russet 1964, 444), which is based in degree of concentrations of agricultural lands (Russett 
1964, 444). Russett indicates that instability is a concept which is difficult to transform into a 
operational definition, where he uses instability of personnel, internal group violence and 
internal wars as some measures of instability (Russett 1964, 447-448). The assessment of this 
use of concept is that it is in this thesis that inequality obviously is a satisfactorily concept for 
the inequality side of the IC-nexus, but not when it is reduces to economic inequality. But that 
is not the major challenge here. It is more of a problem that instability is used on the conflict 
side, since it is in this thesis understood that this concept is considered too vague to reach the 
aforementioned, in the earlier chapters, empirical universals, because it can take too many 
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directions when climbing down the ladder of abstraction. Here instability is just seen as a 
vaguer expression of conflict, which don't uphold the demands of empirical universals. I do 
not criticize this choice of concept, rather I approve of the effort to instigate an empirical 
strain of testing of the IC-nexus, and assert that just by bringing about these types of studies, 
contribute hugely to the field of conflict studies. And it would be surprising if the most 
suitable concepts were identified immediately. The results from Russett's study nevertheless 
concludes that the usually accepted theoretical connection of the IC-nexus must not be taken 
for granted, though he also assert that the expectations from de Tocqueville of surviving 
democratic regimes and equality seems accurate (Russett 1964, 453). This indicates a slight 
support for Figure 1 in Model 3, shown above. 
 
The next empirical study included here is a study of Manoucher Parvin in 1973 on economic 
determinants of political unrest, where he studies: "(...) economic explanation of political 
unrest, (...)." (Parvin 1973, 273). He continues to write that he is aware of other types not all 
types of demands is found in economic causes, but propose a hypothesis of that: "Economic 
well-being (or deprivation) is a fundamental motive of political action in general and manifest 
political unrest in particular." (Parvin 1973, 276). The conclusion of Parvin's study indicate 
several types of influences and bases them most on absolute and not relative influence of 
economical standards, but he also points to that increases in income growth rates which 
should fulfil some demands of both collective and individual level, that from a certain 
threshold: "(...), a higher income growth rate would increase violence rather than decrease it." 
(Parvin 1973, 292). This effect is more consistent to Figure 2 in Model 3, with the plain 
negative effect, but including that this effect takes place from a certain threshold. Parvin 
continues to write that there is some consistency with other studies in that economic 
inequality shows sign to relate to political unrest, but it is more the absolute economical 
situation which is the major influential factor, when it comes to relative or absolute divisions 
of economic distribution (Parvin 1973, 292). A factor that Parvin includes that is consistent 
with the framework supported in this thesis is that he includes the opportunity side of the IC-
nexus, as shown earlier is a subcategory of inequality. Parvin includes this as socioeconomic 
mobility operationalized through education, where the effect of this factor reduces the 
influence of deprivation through the possibilities it provides to envision an improved situation 
in a temporal manner (Parvin 1973, 293). Though fairly consistent with the setup of concepts 
that is supported in this thesis, it diverges to a certain degree from Russett's study. But Parvins 
study does not exclude relative deprivation as a factor that can cause conflict, but income 
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growth rate and socioeconomic mobility are stronger forces as the cause for conflict (Parvin 
1973, 293). So the concepts in this study lies to a certain degree close to a more general 
approach in that he mention other forms of inequality than economic inequality and includes 
opportunity through education, but is still, as in opposition to Russett's study, an example of 
diverging result of empirical tests of the IC-nexus. 
 
The third empirical investigation that is include here is the study of inequality and discontent 
by Jack Nagel in 1974, where he starts his study with an inclusion of that he argues that the 
IC-nexus effect is curvilinear, i.e. that discontent is at the lower levels when inequality is 
either high or low (Nagel 1974, 453), which is the effect shown in Figure 4 in Model 3 above. 
When it comes to inequality, he does at least use the term inequality, but it is hard to identify 
a thorough discussion of the concept, but it seems to include a general relation to when: "(...) 
important values are distributed most equally or most unequally." (Nagel 1974, 453). Though 
he uses the concept of discontent, or political discontent where the consequences of this 
concepts includes: "(...) protest, instability, violence, revolution (...)." (Nagel 1974, 453). 
Though is it necessary to include that the support for Nagel's hypothesis is not conclusive, but 
neither inconclusive in a way that it is discarded. The evidence is more ambiguous (Nagel 
1974, 469). But the interest of this thesis is more to the use of the concept of discontent, 
which is supposed to lead to other forms of conflict. On this occasion, it appears that this 
study does not provide a concept that is an empirical universal, in the same manner as with 
Russetts study where instability was the concept used. The substitution to conflict would 
provide a more concrete, but still general concept which has the ability to both include a range 
of instances of conflicts, but also is more suited to reduced abstractness than both discontent 
and instability seem to have the capacity of. As shown above, Nagel includes both the 
concepts of instability and violence into discontent, but Russett goes straight to instability. 
This makes it hard to make immediately reasonable comparisons, since it is difficult enough 
to grasp what people intend to lay of meaning in a concept, even if they use the same term, let 
alone if someone use interchangeable terms on the same concepts. 
 
Erich Weede reports in his study that: "(...) no significant relationship between inequality and 
violence could be detected." (Weede 1981, 639). When Weede continues, he takes a position 
for finding data in average income, income inequality and collective violence, where 
collective violence is linked up with: "(...): armed attacks and deaths from political violence 
(...)." (Weede 1981, 642-643). On this instance it can be reasonable to include the concepts of 
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structural theory in where the issue of violence can be both structural and personal, where the 
instances which Weede uses indicates strong tendencies of clearly observable instances of 
violence, which is reasonable since it is a empirical investigation, though it can conceal some 
societal mechanisms which are more hidden functions of harmful actions. Nevertheless, this 
study shows support for a mechanism of the IC-nexus which can be found in Figure 3 in 
Model 3 of no relation, shown above. Weede also include some adjustment to his findings, in 
that he cannot falsify relative deprivations effect on conflict, and in addition that he did not 
include measures of power, opportunity and collective resource possibilities in his evaluation 
of level of violence, even though they are suspected to correlate (Weede 1981, 652). Here the 
use of terms are closer to the IC-nexus concepts used in this thesis, by using the concepts of 
inequality and violence. 
 
Christopher Cramer writes about inequality and conflict and highlight some dimensions that 
needs to be included when studying this relation. He writes that one must be aware of the 
different kinds of inequalities that exist, but also includes a caveat for empirical research in 
that poor quality if data on inequality also must be taken into consideration when trying to 
study the IC-nexus. In addition that the diverging definition of inequality could cause 
problems for measuring its effect (Cramer 2003, 397). Though for the type of concepts used, 
even though he has a clear starting point of inequality and conflict, it seems that at least for 
the conflict side that it is divided into civil conflict and violent conflict without clarifying the 
differences (Cramer 2003, 397). And even though he acknowledge that there exist several 
forms of inequalities he concludes with some preconditions that: "(...) economic inequality is 
hugely important to explaining civil conflict." (Cramer 2003, 409). In addition in his article, 
there is an example that the division of horizontal and vertical dimensions of inequality is 
seeping into the IC-nexus research when Cramer includes this dimension with a reference to 
the work of Frances Stewart (Cramer 2003, 409), where the suggestion from the work of 
Stewart is that horizontal inequalities leads to conflict between groups (Stewart 2000, 245). 
The conceptual implications from Cramer's use of them is that even if the concept of 
inequality is developing in a more sophisticating direction by also including elements of 
horizontal and vertical inequalities, it is still economical inequalities that are mainly the 





On the fringes of the IC-nexus there have been two studies that in the early 2000 that tried to 
research causes for civil wars. The reason for positioning them at the outer edge of the IC-
nexus is because these studies have a specific focus of civil war as the type of conflict of 
interest. The first study is a study of Fearon and Laitin which points to that what explain 
occurrences of civil war is not where: "(...) ethnic or other broad political grievances are 
strongest." (Fearon and Laitin 2003, 75). From this is here deducted that there is an indication 
of an underlying idea of inequality, as they later on includes inequality in one of their 
hypothesis that includes economical inequality (Fearon and Laitin 2003, 79), where this 
hypothesis again later is seen in contrast to the occurrences of civil war on grievances (Fearon 
and Laitin 2003, 81). Even if this is an instance not in the centre of the IC-nexus studies, they 
include inequality, which is translated into economical inequality and where they include, as 
did Cramer above, that the data on inequality may not be satisfactory (Fearon and Laitin 2003, 
85). The conceptual connection here then, related to the IC-nexus, seems to go directly from 
economical inequality to civil war. That is not a problem in itself, but it may be a challenge 
when comparing this study to other IC-nexus studies. 
 
The second study of the early 2000s on civil war from Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler also 
includes grievances. Though in their inclusion of inequality, this concept is separated from 
gradation of political rights and other divisions of society (Collier and Hoeffler 2004, 563). 
Inequality is later also shown by measuring economic inequality that inequality is in fact 
economic inequality (Collier and Hoeffler 2004, 570). In the same study, opportunities are 
also included, but not as a part of inequality, but rather as opportunities for rebels to be able to 
rebel (Collier and Hoeffler 2004, 563). The conclusion from this study is also that the 
opportunities for rebelling has influence on possibilities for conflict, but economic 
performance, which includes distribution of income, i.e. economic inequality, does not 
increase the risk of conflict (Collier and Hoeffler 2004, 587-588). This civil war study as with 
the former, they are a bit challenging in comparing them up against other more clearly centred 
IC-nexus studies. On the positive side, they demarcate a clear type of conflict, but as has been 
argued in this thesis, this zooming in to a specific type of conflict, as in political conflict or 
civil conflict, can at sometimes obscure the causes or mechanisms one tries to detect, at least 





In a combination of some of the themes above, in 2011 Cederman, Weidmann and Gleditsch 
wrote an article on horizontal inequalities and civil wars that had ethno nationalistic traits, 
though they seem to use the concepts of civil war and conflict interchangeably (Cederman, 
Weidmann and Gleditsch 2011, 478). In their results, what they find through the use of some 
new methods is that: "(...), in highly unequal societies, both rich and poor groups fight more 
often than those groups whose wealth lies closer to the country average." (Cederman, 
Weidmann and Gleditsch 2011, 478). They specify that they are following the trend of 
shifting over to horizontal from vertical instances of inequality, and claim that the issue of the 
conflict and inequality is not over, even if the aforementioned studies on civil war above did 
conclude that the inequality cause of conflict did not exist (Cederman, Weidmann and 
Gleditsch 2011, 478). What the trio find in their study is that they divide inequality up in a 
political and an economical dimension, where these dimensions of horizontal inequality 
contribute to the occurrences of civil war, and in addition they argue that they find: "(...) the 
civil war literature's tendency to downplay the importance of grievances as a source of 
internal conflict is both premature and misguided." (Cederman, Weidmann and Gleditsch 
2011, 479). When the study turns to empirical testing of the theoretical setup, they specify as 
has others done when it comes to inequality-conflict studies, that the data availability can be 
unsatisfactory, and almost all statistical tests of the horizontal inequality dimension have used 
surveys on economical welfare as their data foundation (Cederman, Weidmann and Gleditsch 
2011, 483). In this instance they clearly connect their civil war research up to the IC-nexus by 
using inequality and conflict as the field of study. Even so, they conclude their study with that 
ethnic groups distanced from the average per capita income are more involved in civil 
conflicts (Cederman, Weidmann and Gleditsch 2011, 429). And a final note that they include 
before closing the study is related to the challenges of which indicators that should be used to 
test the IC-nexus: "Rejecting ''messy'' factors, such as grievances and inequalities, may lead to 
more elegant models that can more easily be tested, but the fact remains that some of the most 
intractable and damaging conflict processes in the contemporary world, (...), are to a large 
extent about political and economic injustice." (Cederman, Weidmann and Gleditsch 2011, 
492). From this statement, though including conflict not civil war, and substituting 
inequalities and injustice, a substantial point is made, that even, at least in scientific 
approaches, some simplifications of the world needs to be made when studying it, especially 
when the social component is involved, but there has to be limitations to this simplification as 
well. So that the object is not to just provide results that are in compliance with the 
contemporary scientific guidelines, but also reflects the realities of the world to a certain 
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degree. In the IC-nexus studies this also applies, where Cederman, Weidmann and Gleditsch 
continue to claim in their study that: "It is very unlikely that such conflicts can ever be 
understood, let alone durably solved, without taking seriously the claims of marginalized 
populations." (Cederman, Weidmann and Gleditsch 2011, 492). In this study, the concepts 
used are related to the IC-nexus, but not exclusively tied to inequality and conflict. It is as 
with the above mentioned studies related to a specific type of conflict, i.e. civil war, but do 
substitute civil war and conflict at will it seems, though the part of inequality has a more 
sophisticated use with focus of horizontal inequalities and a division of political and 
economical inequalities. This last part of division of inequalities can to a certain degree 
comply with the division of opportunities and resources supported in this thesis. 
 
The final empirical studies of the IC-nexus is a group of three recent investigations, mainly to 
see what kind concepts is in use here. The results of the test are of less interest, since it has 
already been shown by empirical investigations that the effect of the IC-nexus can be 
documented to go in almost any direction possible, but the results will be included anyway, 
since it is of interest to see what some of the most recent studies on the IC-nexus shows. The 
first of three recent studies is from Henrikas Bartusevicius which takes its position clearly in 
the IC-nexus, where he uses the term inequality-conflict nexus, though also uses civil conflict 
and civil war conflict, but specifies that these two concepts will be contained in the concept of 
conflict (Bartusevicius 2019, 339). When it comes to inequality, he uses the dimensions of 
horizontal and vertical inequality, but specifies that he is going to focus on economical 
inequality (Bartusevicius 2019, 339-340), though instead of dividing inequalities into 
resources and opportunities, he divide them into a combination of economical goods and 
economical opportunities (Bartusevicius 2019, 342). So he uses the conceptual division also 
supported here, by dividing inequalities into goods (resources) and opportunities, though both 
inside the dominion of economical inequalities. The result from his study shows that there 
exist some clear links between types of inequalities, sometimes formulated as advantages or 
deprivations, i.e. here understood as the consequences of inequalities, with the inclusion that 
the type of inequality also can influence the type of conflict (Bartusevicius 2019, 340). This 
leads Bartusevicius to encourage that it is important to find out how the mechanism in the IC-
nexus works, which in turn can help policymakers to make decisions that can reduce conflict 
if that is their intention, and to be able to do this, that is: "To avoid conflicts, we first need to 
know how they start." (Bartusevicius 2019, 352), and I want to add to this that to avoid 
conflicts, we first need to know what it is. And not just as a concept used in discussions, 
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where it may function even if it contain some flexibility of meaning, but as a subject of 
textual investigation. This is because there are different restrictions on our use of concepts in 
written and conversational usage (Blau 2017, 252). These investigations can both be scientific 
and philosophical investigations, but also theoretical, as is attempted in this thesis, where the 
demands for these types of investigations could clearly profit on a clear framework to advance 
from, at least at the most abstract levels, where maybe the opportunity for consensus is more 
easily found. 
 
The second of the three recent IC-nexus studies included here is a study from Christian Houle 
where he focuses on social mobility and political instability, where social mobility here is 
seen as distinct from inequality, and he argues that social immobility leads to political 
instability (Houle 2019, 85). What he finds is that: "(...) countries with low social mobility 
levels are more likely to experience riots, general strikes, antigovernment demonstrations, 
political assassinations, guerillas, revolutions, and civil wars." (Houle 2019, 85). Here the 
concept of political instability seems to contain all these instances of conflict, in contrast to 
some of the above studies which had a concrete focus on civil war, which here is just part of 
the concept of political instability. Even though the conflict side of the IC-nexus here, i.e. the 
concept of political instability has some differences, (but also some similarities as instability 
is the same concept that Russett used in 1964 as shown above), from other concepts used on 
the conflict side in the mentioned IC-nexus studies, it is the inequality side which is of most 
interest here, because of some novel treatment. In relation with the setup of concepts for this 
thesis, it is found motivating to see the use of the opportunity side of inequality included in a 
study on the IC-nexus, though Houle does make a distinction of inequality and social mobility 
which may not be necessary. Houle writes that: "(...), inequality and social mobility, although 
related, are fundamentally distinct." (Houle 2019, 85). Though later on, he makes a 
transformation from inequality to economic inequality without mentioning this sudden 
reduction of abstractness: "Although related, the concepts of social mobility and inequality 
are fundamentally distinct. Economic inequality refers to the degree to which people within 
the same society have different income/wealth levels. In principle, a society could be highly 
unequal, for example, without social mobility being low." (Houle 2019, 88). As is the 
approach in this thesis to support a more refined concept of inequality than not just 
automatically understand inequality as economical inequality, but also to include the 
opportunity side of inequality, it is here found that this mention of social mobility have the 
prospect of maybe filling this position through a dichotomous understanding of inequality. 
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This can be found in Houles study as well, by scrutinizing some of his formulations. He 
writes that:"Even when inequality is high, individuals may be able to move up in the social 
hierarchy through "regular", non-violent, means. Social immobility, however, (...), indicates 
that the poor lack such opportunities." (Houle 2019, 90). From this it is possible to extract that 
it is only the poor who lacks this opportunity when social immobility exist, i.e. the rich are not 
under the same restrictions, and thus manifests inequalities in opportunities. So through this 
argumentation, the approach of Houle in including social mobility as a factor in studying the 
IC-nexus is here highly supported, but for the object of finding a common conceptual 
framework for these kinds of studies, it is in this thesis considered that social mobility should 
occupy one of the dimensions of inequality, and not be seen as distinct different from 
inequality, which usually only supposes economical inequality anyway. The results from 
Houles study, besides the understanding of social mobility should be seen as a possible 
dimension of inequality or not, is that it points in the direction that increased levels of social 
mobility is consistent with reduced level of political stability (Houle 2019, 100-103). 
 
The last of the empirical studies included in this thesis, which is also the last of the three 
recent IC-nexus studies included here is a study from Karin Dyrstad and Solveig Hillesund, 
where they through survey based data try to explain peoples support for political violence 
(Dyrstad and Hillesund 2020, 1724). They include in their study the concept of political 
efficacy, where they refer to the work of George I. Balch for the term of political efficacy and 
to Richard D. Shingles for its definition (Dyrstad and Hillesund 2020, 1730). Balch mentions 
that political efficacy has two aspects which is one that points to the trust to the political 
system, in which how the response from the political structure is perceived, and a second 
aspect points to how individuals evaluates how their own capacity in the political system will 
be effectual (Balch 1974, 31). Which is translated into the definition that is found in Shingles 
that these two components are combined in expectation for effectual, or successful type of 
political activity (Shingles 1981, 80). This concept of political efficacy is related to the 
political opportunity structure and influences both horizontal and vertical support for political 
violence (Dyrstad and Hillesund 2020, 1724). The inequality side in the study of Dyrstad and 
Hillesund is connected to grievances, though not directly, since they seem to separate 
grievances and perceptions of grievances (Dyrstad and Hillesund 2020, 1727), though to 
transform that understanding in compliance with the setup of this thesis, this is here 
understood as just the different consequence of relative or absolute inequalities. Grievances 
are grievances whatever the source is, either real or imaginary. Either way, the relation to the 
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IC-nexus, one of the interesting point to this study for the setup of concepts for this thesis is 
that it includes political efficacy as a way to diffuse conflicts into solutions through non-
violent means. This is included in the conclusion of the study where it is supposed that: "If 
people believe they can have their grievances addressed through regular political channels, 
their anger can be funnelled into peaceful opposition, which helps undermine the ability of 
violent insurgency to take root." (Dyrstad and Hillesund 2020, 1745). This suggest that there 
exist a dimension of conflicts that can be resolved peacefully, and which also legitimatize that 
conceptualization around the IC-nexus on the conflict side also should include a non-violent 
dimension. This is to enhance the understanding of the IC-nexus. Because if inequality 
increases conflict, and in a study of a society with high levels of inequality shows low levels 
of violent conflicts, that doesn't necessarily mean that conflict doesn't follow inequality. An 
alternative explanation for the low levels of violent conflict can be that the society, most 
likely through its state, have the capacity through its structure to diffuse the conflicts by non-
violent means, though the empirical scientist is left perplexed since he cannot observe any 
coup d'états, and conclude that there is no relation between inequality and conflict. Anyway, I 
have to make a small comment to what Dyrestad and Hillesund write of non-violent modes of 
conflict solutions, and that is that the proposition is that political avenues are not the only way 
of peacefully, or at least whiteout violence, to resolve conflicts. The juridical apparatus is 
clearly a candidate to both transform conflicts into the non-violent dimension in practical 
forms, but also is a very prone candidate to assist empirical scientist to measure the non-
violent side of conflicts. 
 
To close of the empirical chapter here, it will, as with the theoretic overview, get its own short 
summary. This is that by the evolution of these, mostly quantitative, empirical studies 
included here, a picture of the concepts in the IC-nexus seem to have evolved from forms of 
economical inequality to a more broader understanding of inequality, with the turn to the 
division of horizontal and vertical inequalities, but also into inequality diverging away from 
synonymous applying inequality with economical inequality as seems to be an common 
approach, where inequality if opportunity seems to emerge as a dimension in recent IC-nexus 
studies. On the conflict side, it seems that many forms of violent conflicts have dominated 
these studies, under different names of instability, unrest, violence, civil war, political conflict 
and other subcategories of these concepts again. Though an encouraging detection in the latest 
empirical study included in this thesis was the incorporation of non-violent means of the 
conflict side, which can make the setup of the concepts of the IC-nexus used in this thesis 
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seem to have the capacity to constitute the conceptual framework of the two part outline of 
the general framework for the IC-nexus, in a way that includes the high and middle levels of 
abstractions for the concepts in the IC-nexus. This is where the last part of this discussion now 
will turn, with a short setup of the outline of general framework for the IC-nexus. 
 
Chapter 7: Discussion and results 
 
The theme for this thesis has been the IC-nexus with a main focus on the theory and concepts 
used when studying this nexus through the approach of political theory. For the approach 
chosen, it has been shown that political theory has had some fluctuations in its academic 
positioning and understanding the last hundred years, though the approach used here is a 
broad form of political theory. To some degree it could be argued that in this thesis the part of 
political theory have occupied more space than necessary, though this is a conscious choice, 
since there are currently several ways to understand political theory, and it was here judged 
that to elaborate on political theory and what it is was warranted for providing a better 
understanding of the IC-nexus. 
 
An objective of this thesis was to be able to present an outline of a general framework for the 
IC-nexus. This outline will be presented here and consist of two parts, which is first a 
theoretic position for the mechanism of the IC-nexus supported in this thesis, and second is 
the conceptual framework for the same nexus, which has been developed in this thesis. The 
theoretic position supported is a simple proposition, and not a novel one. It is the same as 
Figure 1 in Model 3, which is a simple linear positive relation between inequality and conflict. 
The presentation of the support of this theoretical position is mainly done to clarify which of 
the many theoretical availabilities which exist of the IC-nexus that the conceptual framework 
rests on, and to reduce the possibility of misunderstanding the theoretical position supported 
in this thesis. It also provides a context for evaluating other elements which have been 
revealed in this thesis. The theoretical position supported in this thesis is also shown below, in 
Model 4, where also the concept of optimal inequality is included. The same model also 





Model 4: Position of theoretic support for the IC-nexus (positive).
 
 
The brief way of explaining the support of the theoretic position shown here, based on the 
concepts introduced earlier, the theoretic overview, and the empirical results included in this 
thesis is that the support of the mechanism shown in Model 4 is that inequality increases the 
probability of conflict in a society. The reason it is here judged to function through probability 
is as earlier specified that there is assumed to be an abundance of causes that can influence the 
direct cause between inequality and conflict. The support for the IC-nexus mechanism in this 
thesis is based on that it is based in a position from the conflict school of thoughts that human 
society is based on conflictual relations. The understanding is also based on that DA theory 
provides a more sophisticated explanation of the connection of how inequality is perceived by 
the social actors, which makes the mechanism supposedly harder to detect, but RA theories 
can provide a simpler tool for empirical investigations, but through its simplification it also 
risks to miss the target. The division between horizontal and vertical inequalities is not 
included in the model above, since the effect above is considered to apply on both aspects of 
inequality, even though the empirical evidence indicates a difference. This is because, as will 
be shown below, that there exist some conceptual inaccuracies when it comes to the empirical 
testing of the IC-nexus, and thus the results from the empirical tests lose a bit of their 
credibility when any comparisons is done between, in opposition to inside, the tests. This 
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means that the division of HOI and VOI is here seen as mostly a decision that confronts an 
empirical scientist when trying to test the IC relation. I.e. if he wants to investigate 
inequalities based on individual or collective characteristics, or maybe even find some 
avenues for combining both aspects of this division. The other division of inequality into the 
two here supported dimensions of resources and opportunities is extracted from both de 
Tocqueville with the focus on the equality of conditions, which I judge to partly cover both 
aspects of inequality. And also the propositions taken from Gurr with the mechanism from the 
value capabilities and value expectations, which through the conductor of scope and intensity 
can manifest itself through societal conflicts, both violent and non-violent. The modifier that 
Gurr includes with salience is a central issue which can function as a large confounder, and is 
needed to be investigated closer for societies which will be the subject of an IC-nexus study, 
as the inequality of what question from Sen reappears, in that one would have to know which 
types of inequalities that is salient in the societies one wants to investigate, and also what that 
constitutes opportunities and resources in a society. Opportunity from Gurr is directly 
incorporated in the conceptual structure for this thesis, as it is one of the dimensions of 
inequality supported here. These mechanisms are also related to the FAR and the ECR, which 
is found in and in between the theoretical understanding here, in that the frustration-
aggression relation is connected to the idea of the DA, and expectation capabilities relation is 
related to the scope and intensity of the theory that Gurr provides, as is one of the central 
foundations for his theory. The idea of optimal inequality is related to that all societies have 
inequality as part of its DNA to be able to provide a social product, though when the primary 
yield of the societal hierarchal organization is harvested, an increase in inequality does not 
provide a greater available social product, since it has to be used in defusing rising conflicts, 
both violent and non-violent, which when passing the level of optimal inequality takes more 
of the social product than it creates. And in trying to detect this mechanism in the IC-nexus, 
there has to be appreciated that there are different types of inequalities and different types of 
conflicts that can explain this effect, and if they are not controlled for, the result can be 
misleading. The focus on, or rather, the lack of inclusion of the different types of inequality 
and conflicts is an issue found in the selection of empirical tests included in this theoretic 
evaluation of the IC-nexus, as will be shown below, and is here supposed to be a source of the 
inconsistent empirical results. 
 
The selected empirical results included in this thesis have been shown through its presentation 
in the text and visualization through Model 3 (positive, negative, null and concave), to point 
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in several different directions for the mechanism of the IC-nexus. The different ways of 
testing the IC-nexus from the selected empirical tests, which support the different ways of 
how the function of the IC-nexus is understood, is shown in Model 5 below. This model is 
based on Model 2b, introduced in the earlier chapters of this thesis. What is shown in Model 5 
is how the different empirical investigations seems to have been weighted in relation to the 
conceptual setup provided in Model 2b. There are two types of relations, a primary and a 
secondary, where these two relations are taken here by how these empirical tests in this thesis 
have been evaluated to apply to the conceptual setup. The positioning of the relations in the 
model have been made on an evaluation of both use of concepts and the underlying 




As shown above in Model 5 there are several different ways in which the IC-nexus have been 
investigated. The main line seems to originate in economical inequality and either go to a 
broader understanding of conflict or directly to violent political conflict. But there are also 
other avenues taken. But maybe the most interesting picture here is that almost all 
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subcategories of inequality and conflict have been used, though resources seems mainly to be 
directly understood as economical resources, as is understandable, (though not satisfactory), 
with its capacity to measure resources in a standardized way, and can be collected as data 
fairly easy as well. This makes the Model 2a, already presented earlier in this thesis, seem as a 
suitable model to use as it already was setup as the conceptual framework, since it is clear and 
simple, which seems to be a necessary attribute for the development of a conceptual 
framework which can provide a foundation for increased clarity when investigating the IC-
nexus. And a more sophisticated, or more complex conceptual framework seems to be more 
suitable for future evaluations, if tests based on the conceptual framework presented here can 
provide satisfactory results. The conceptual framework in this thesis, as shown below in 
Model 6, has a general starting point with the division of inequality and conflict, but also 
provides a structure for reduced abstractness with four possible dimensions available which 
can easier be connected to empirical scrutiny, without making quantum leaps from high levels 
of abstraction to low level concrete operationalized concepts. This makes me take a decision 
for this thesis, in accordance with the current zeitgeist of reuse, at least on an idealistic level, 
(obviously not at a practical level), in just recycling Model 2a, as the model used as the 
conceptual framework of the outline of the general framework for the IC-nexus, applicable to 
use when studying the IC-nexus. Though it is here rebranded from Model 2a to Model 6, 
among others since it has been made a small modification on the model in its title. 
 




The reason for choosing this model as the conceptual framework is that it seems that only by 
providing this small setup of clear connections it can provide a tool to organize IC-nexus 
research on several different levels, which seems to have been missing all along, and is in this 
thesis perceived as a possible cause for the inconclusiveness in the results from IC-nexus 
studies. It is shown that it has some connections to both empirical and theoretical dimensions, 
and it is also a clear enough setup that maybe philosophic approaches can utilize the same 
setup, besides theoretical and scientific approaches, to scrutinize the concepts further. This 
provides a foundation for interaction between the three types of studies, scientifically, 
theoretical and philosophical. And for the empirical scientist, there seems to be clear, though 
broad, avenues for possible operationalization from the mid-levels of abstraction, with 
education and possibilities for political involvement for opportunities, monetary measures for 
resources, judiciary structures for non-violent conflict, and violent conflict at least as 
instances of physical harm. Though the psychological harm may still be more difficult to 
detect. This is maybe where the issues of personal and structural violence, (though it may be 
amended to personal and structural conflict), can provide some answers, but has in this thesis 
not been found applicable to include on the level of abstractions that has been included in the 
conceptual framework above, though it can be found possible to combine this type of thought 
with the understanding of violent and non-violent conflict, or as reduced abstractions of these 
dimensions. But based on this conceptual framework, that dimension is judged to lie beyond 
the scope of this thesis, as the model of the conceptual framework is proposed as an effort to 
contribute to create a common ground for studies trying to detect the function of the IC-nexus. 
There is still a long way to go, and finding myself returning to the original conceptual setup as 
the most satisfactorily conceptual framework at this point, feels to a certain degree more like a 
step back than forward, but that may sometimes be the best way to advance. It is at least 
where the path of the research done in this thesis has led. 
 
Chapter 8: Conclusion 
 
The main elements emphasised in this thesis has throughout been on the IC-nexus. This 
relation, i.e. the relation between inequality and conflict in society, is still not clearly 
understood, though recent developments in empirical studies have shown some advances in 
the direction of connecting inequalities to conflict through the division of horizontal and 
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vertical inequalities, and some have included non-violent means of solving conflicts, as well 
as including opportunities as a dimension of inequality. This has been introduced in this thesis 
into a final two-part outline of a general framework for the IC-nexus where the use of political 
theory has been the main avenue of research, and where support for a specific theoretical 
position of the nexus have been provided together with a conceptual framework of the IC-
nexus. Both parts of the general framework have been presented as models, and it was found 
necessary to make the models clear and simple, especially for the conceptual one, since the 
results of the IC-tests were not. An additional point which is here found significant to 
emphasise, even though it seem to be partly a marginal component of this thesis is that it is 
found here that it would be of great value if political theory could continued to be developed 
into a broader unified form in political studies, where it is able to enhance understandings of 
the results of academic studies, but also of real politics. This is because, as pointed out earlier, 
political theory may be a source of conceptual clarity, which appears to be a major challenge, 
at least for scientific approaches which mainly seems to be concerned with producing results, 
and maybe less concerned with understanding them. That is why it is here considered 
productive to use a broad understanding of political theory and favours political theory to 
occupy its natural space of evaluating results from the scientific production facilities, in 
cooperation with philosophical approaches, foremost through the use of practical theorizing. 
 
Finally, I return to the more concrete product of this thesis, which is the outline of the general 
framework for the IC-nexus which consists of the support of a specific theoretical mechanism 
of the IC-nexus (i.e. positive), and in addition the conceptual framework developed here. And 
I want to close this conclusion and this thesis with some avenues for further research based on 
this outline of the general framework for the IC-nexus. The outline is hopefully general 
enough to reach over to different fields in political studies. Continued scrutiny of the concepts 
would be welcome, either by philosophical advancement for the understanding of the content 
of the concepts, or alternatively a more thorough scientific investigation of a broader set of 
empirical studies, to see if the findings in this thesis can be generalized beyond what is shown 
here. For political theorist, the support for further research is an advancement from a broader 
form of political theory, where a position between philosophy and science seems productive, 
where one can utilize perspectives, methods and methodologies from a wider range of 
political studies, including its own field of political theory, and in that way be able to enhance 
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